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INTRODUCTION 
There have been debates on the trade issue between the 
U.S. and Japan. It is claimed that Japan exports too much and 
imports too little. Economic activities by Japanese firms in 
U.S. markets have been discussed in several articles. This 
dissertation investigates the economic decision rule for 
imports by Japanese firms. 
Explanation of Dissertation Format 
This dissertation is composed of two parts. Part I is an 
examination of the Japanese trade policy. Japan is one of 
most liberalized industrialized countries in terms of 
"visible" trade restrictions such as tariff rates or quotas. 
Regardless of that, Japan has been still criticized because of 
the closeness and those criticisms are based on "invisible" 
import restrictions. They are sometimes related to the 
economic structure which has been culturally developed in a 
long time of the history. It is important to clarify the 
characteristics of "invisible" restrictions. An attempt is 
made in Part I of this dissertation to identify the possible 
import restrictions which may be implemented in the Japanese 
economy and empirically to examine whether they actually 
exist. The possible cases considered are the presence of 
volume or ratio quota, distribution costs for imports, or 
threat by the government against imports. The theoretical 
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model is developed to predict how import price, which has 
significantly varied in 1980s, and domestic cost affect 
domestic economic variables under the hypothetical import 
restriction. The empirical testings are expected to reveal 
what type of "invisible" restrictions are actually 
implemented, after comparing the theoretical predictions. 
Sixteen commodities which show relative homogeneity between 
domestically produced goods and imports are selected. The 
additional findings for pass-through (i.e., how domestic price 
changes when exchange rate changes) coefficients, symmetry of 
tariff and exchange rates and exogeneity of import prices are 
also reported. In order to examine the role of market 
structure on the pass-through coefficient, an effect of 
production concentration ratio on domestic prices is tested. 
In Part II, Bresnahan's idea to measure the market power 
coefficient is extended to marketing firms and applied to 
Japanese soybean markets. The data show unusually high price 
setting by soybean importers at wholesale level for the 
several years after the U. S. embargo in 1973. The 
statistical significance of the market power coefficient is 
used to examine the presence of the market power in the 
soybean markets. Analysis for welfare loss and exchange rate 
transmission is also presented. 
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PART I. PASS-THROUGH EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE RATES 
AND JAPANESE TRADE POLICIES 
4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Preface 
The widespread swings of the major currencies in the 
1980s have triggered much concern about and research on 
exchange rate pass-through issues. The particular concern is 
centered around the degree of pass-through of the large 
currency fluctuation. Many economists have devoted 
considerable work to show that the degree of pass-through has 
been unexpectedly low and the conventional economic theory 
provides inadequate explanation of such a phenomenon. Several 
economists have discussed why transmission of the exchange 
rate changes into markets is incomplete under imperfectly 
competitive environment (Krugman, 1986; Mann, 1986; Dornbusch, 
1987). They show that monopolistic foreign firms in the 
domestic market can squeeze (expand) their markups over the 
marginal cost when the domestic currency appreciates 
(depreciates). This adjustment occurs since the foreign firms 
perceive that the market demand is not perfectly elastic. 
Under such imperfectly competitive markets, foreign firms 
exercise their market power and practice price discrimination. 
This behavior has been named 'pricing to market' by Krugman 
(1986). Since then, there have been several articles which 
have revealed pricing to market behavior by Japanese exporters 
in American markets (Marston, 1989; Branson and Marston, 1989; 
Ohno, 1989; Mann, 1989). If this is true, Japanese products 
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may have been priced less abroad than in domestic markets.^ 
The Japanese internal price level of domestically produced 
goods or imports has also attracted significant attention. 
Some of the surveys^ point out that many among selected 
commodities which are produced in the U.S. or in third 
countries are priced much higher in Japan than in the U.S. 
The guestion is whether non-Japanese exporters are exercising 
market power or whether internal systems in Japan are 
preventing prices from adjusting to exporters' pricing. This 
study is an attempt to analyze the latter guestion. 
B. Particular Characteristics in the Japanese Economy 
Japanese visible import barriers, such as tariffs and 
quotas, are minimal among industrialized countries. Hence, 
the existence of "invisible" import barriers has been alleged 
when difficulties to penetrate Japanese markets are complained 
by foreign exporters. Conceptually, these barriers or 
restrictions could be due to the government or to the private 
sector. 
The role of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), which is in charge of trade issues, has been 
controversial. The economic system implemented during the 
^However, Hooper and Mann (1989) found that Japanese 
exporters have priced to market less that U.S. exporter have. 
^Including Japan-U.S. price co-investigation requested in 
the first Japan-U.S. structural Impediment Committee. 
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occupation era did not allow the bureaucracy to control the 
whole economy as was the case before the war, while many 
inferior economic conditions such as short capital supply, 
deficient technology and continuing trade deficit, 
necessitated a strong lead by the central government. Thus, 
the government started to share the powers with big business 
by consulting it on various occasions, and sending their 
senior bureaucrats into the board of directors of the 
influential industries. During the course of rapidly growing 
economy, especially after the liberalization became inevitable 
in 1960s, there was a time when too many protected enterprises 
in too many small factories engaged in too vigorous 
competition. Immediate liberalization meant that foreign 
competitors would eliminate the domestic industries. Altering 
the industrial structure, encouraging cartels, enforcing 
mergers on medium and small enterprises, by government loans 
and tax breaks seemed necessary. Obviously, these initiatives 
are possible by large scale cooperation among the Ministry of 
Finance, the Fair Trade Commission (an agency to enforce the 
Antimonopoly Law), bank Keiretsu (conglomerate groups) and the 
other industrialists. After the MITI failed to legalize the 
idea, a term "administrative guidance" appeared as a 
compromise. It refers to the authority of the government to 
issue directives (shiji), requests (yobo), warnings (kikoku), 
suggestions (kankoku) and encouragements (kansho) to the 
enterprises within a particular ministry's jurisdiction. As a 
7 
result, administrative guidance is not based on any explicit 
legal requirements to industries. However, this has an 
advantage that it is very flexible and the government can 
respond to situations very quickly. The lack of a clearly 
defined range, and formal and clear procedures also allows the 
government to abuse the power. For example, the government 
uses investment coordination by which the size of investment 
facilities and outputs is assigned to each firm during the 
recession, promotes mergers in some industries (steel, 
automobile), discourages attempts to introduce foreign capital 
by strict foreign capital controls, and fosters the designated 
industries. In the course of the history of this practice, 
economically weaker firms tend to be good followers of the 
administrative policy, while more financially sound firms, 
which belong to major banking groups tend to be independent 
from the interventions. The reason administrative guidance 
can be a powerful tool is that Japanese businessmen feel that 
the government directions should be respected and government 
Ministries have a wide range of powers. A company which does 
not follow their guidance in one area can be unfavorably 
treated in another area. 
For example, during the attempt by the MITI to stabilize 
the price of steel in 1965, Sumitomo refused to accept the 
assigned market share. The MITI retaliated by threatening to 
restrict imports of coking coal according to the Import 
Control Ordinance. In two months, this incident was 
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peacefully solved by the compromise that Sumitomo would follow 
the administrative guidance if their export quota was raised 
as an exceptional case. 
The MITI took the initiative to give birth to the world's 
biggest steel maker via successful mergers, and sometimes led 
price regulations. In 1973, the MITI was involved with the 
oil cartel formed by petrochemical producers to fix the price 
and to assign the production level (Matsushita and Schoenbaum 
1989, 35; Johnson 1982, 299). These activities should have 
run counter to the Antimonopoly Law, which was implemented in 
1947 during the American occupation. The original law was 
modeled after the U.S. anti-trust laws. However, some 
provisions which provided for the dissolution of a large 
business because of its size were eliminated in 1952. Also, 
the provisions which allow certain cartels such as depressed 
industry cartels and rationalization cartels were added. This 
alteration differentiated it from the U.S. laws under which 
cartels are per se illegal. 
During the occupation era, the old Zaibatsu (family-
centered conglomerate) was dissolved. However, motivated by 
the capital shortage, firms tried to develop close ties with 
particular banks and groups emerged centering around each 
large bank. The "big six" came into being in the 1950s (Fuji, 
Sanwa, Dailchi, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo). A typical 
group includes a big bank, several industrial firms and a 
general trading company. The bank provides the financial 
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capital and the trading company imports raw materials on 
credit and promotes exports for produced goods. Moreover, 
each group tends to create all the government designated 
growth industries as its members. The MITI actively supported 
the grouping of the industries. It is very common that member 
firms in a Keiretsu are involved with cross-shareholding. 
The Japanese distributional system, which has been 
created along with the cultural and social development, is 
another target of criticism as an invisible barrier to foreign 
exporters. Some activities such as long-term processing of 
payments, non-standardized rebate system, territory system 
which strictly restricts sales regions of distributors, 
"itten-ichoai-sei" (a system in which manufactures dictate to 
wholesalers the retailers to whom they must sell) and return 
of unsalable goods may not be compatible with foreign customs. 
These aspects of the Japanese economy might have affected 
trade conditions. What we are going to consider in Part I is 
which aspects of the characteristics have influenced the 
actual import level and to what degree. The large movement of 
the yen in the 1980s enables us to examine the sensitivities 
of domestic prices, import quantities or some other variables 
to changes in import prices. We expect that this will lead us 
to obtain some information about the market structure in 
Japan. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been many recent developments in trade theory 
attempting to explain international trade under imperfect 
competition. Economies of scale, product differentiation, a 
relatively small number of firms in the industry, and wage and 
sales contracts are the sources of imperfect competition in 
these models. However, the models are difficult to test 
empirically. Large fluctuations in the dollar during the last 
decade have enabled tests of the models in terms of the pass-
through issues. 
An analysis of the pass-through of exchange rates is to 
examine changes in import prices in domestic currency or 
export prices in foreign currency when exchange rate changes. 
A starting point for this analysis is the law of one price; 
under the conditions of no transportation costs and no trade 
restrictions, perfect commodity arbitrage guarantees that 
prices of traded goods at home equal prices of similar traded 
goods abroad after the adjustment of exchange rate i.e., 
P - e P* 
where P is price of product in the domestic market in the 
domestic currency, P* is price at which foreign suppliers sell 
the product in term of foreign currency, and e is the exchange 
rate, the domestic currency price of foreign currency. If the 
exchange rate changes and foreign prices remain unchanged, 
domestic prices change correspondingly. In this case, pass-
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through of the exchange rate change to domestic prices is one 
hundred percent. 
A similar concept to pass-through is pricing to market, 
which is introduced by Krugman (1986). When domestic markets 
are thought large enough to influence world prices, domestic 
prices of imports may fail to fall as much as the appreciation 
in the currency. Since a decrease in e (appreciation) is 
partly offset by an increase in P* (an increased demand of the 
less expensive imports in the domestic market induces the 
world demand curve to shift out), the exchange rate change 
does not cause the domestic price to change proportionally 
even though the law of one price still holds. Since P* has 
changed from the original level but P* is charged in any 
foreign markets as world price, pricing to market according to 
Krugman is not occurring in this case. That is, the pass-
through coefficient is less than unity, while the pricing to 
market coefficient is zero. Krugman suggests that this 
imperfect pass-through is not our interest and pricing to 
market is the measure instead of the pass-through if more 
concern is focused on the cases of price discrimination 
conducted by foreign exporters under imperfectly competitive 
markets. 
Pricing to market is measured as a change in export-
domestic price margin with respect to change in exchange rate. 
When the law of one price holds, pricing to market is always 
zero. Let us imagine the case in which Japanese firms import 
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soybeans from the United States. Also, let us assume that the 
yen appreciates by ten percent against the dollar. Then, it 
is expected that the domestic soybean import price from the 
U.S. should decrease by 10 percent if the dollar price stays 
unchanged. However, U.S. exporters may charge more for 
soybeans destined for Japan, and then the U.S. soybean price 
in Japanese markets declines by 10 percent, but rather (for 
example), by 5 percent. Pricing to market by the U.S. 
exporters is being exercised since they are charging different 
prices in different markets. This behavior can lead to the 
presence of black markets, because by the new distribution 
channels the U.S. soybeans can be sold less costly by five 
percent and the Japanese will buy them. 
When a domestic market is not perfectly competitive, 
domestic wholesale price is above cost. 
P  -  e P *  ( 1  +  T )  + M + C 
where M is margin of domestic importers, C is domestic per 
unit marketing cost and t is tariff rate. Here it is clear 
that a change in the import price may not be perfectly 
reflected in the domestic price under imperfect competition, 
since M can adjust even if C is constant. 
The existence of the profit margin is explained by 
various imperfect competition models. One of the major 
streams of theoretical models to explain pass-through is based 
on profit maximization behavior by oligopolistic firms. These 
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oligopolistic firms face a downward-sloping demand curve and 
choose the import level at which marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue. 
Krugman (1986) presents a broad idea about pricing to 
market modeling, including both static and dynamic models. In 
a static oligopoly case, two Cournot firms, (domestic and 
foreign) which are competing in a domestic market to maximize 
their profit functions are assumed. A domestic firm perceives 
that the larger is its market share, the less elastic is the 
demand it faces, so the price the domestic firm chooses to 
charge is higher for any given marginal cost. The larger is 
the foreign firm's market share, the higher is the elasticity 
of demand perceived by the domestic firm. Thus, the price is 
lower. When the domestic currency appreciates, the foreign 
firm's cost declines. Taking advantage of the reduced cost, 
it can expand its market share. The domestic price decreases, 
but this decrease in price is less than the exchange rate 
change, since the foreign firm perceives the market is 
becoming less elastic. Thus, the elasticity of price with 
respect to the exchange rate depends on the curvature of the 
demand curve. 
Dornbusch (1985) also proposes the static model in which 
there are n domestic and n* foreign firms in the economy under 
the Cournot behavior. In the multiple domestic and foreign 
firms' case, the results are about the same as the ones in a 
single domestic firm and a single foreign firm case of 
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Krugman. It is shown that a domestic currency appreciation 
lowers domestic price and the larger is the share of 
importers, the more the domestic price decreases. Again, the 
pass-through coefficient heavily depends on the curvature of 
the demand curve. He analyses the market for homogeneous 
goods by using this model, since the Cournot model assumes 
perfect substitution between different suppliers. However, 
the question becomes whether commodities traded are always 
homogeneous enough to fit the Cournot model description. He 
examines the unit values of imports and exports for various 
commodity groups and shows that there are different price 
adjustment rules between the relatively homogeneous 
commodities (such as food and semi-manufactures) and more 
heterogeneous commodities (finished manufactures). That is, 
for the former group, export and import unit values move 
roughly in line with the expected direction when the exchange 
rate changes. For the latter group, export and import unit 
values always increase regardless of the exchange rate change, 
while exports follow the domestic price trend and imports show 
a much smaller increase. To explain this phenomenon of 
imports, he introduces the Dixit-Stiglitz model and the Salop 
model, and analyses the effect of the exchange rate changes on 
heterogeneous commodities. 
In the Dixit-Stiglitz model, preferences are specified by 
a utility function, which depends on quantities of two 
commodities consumed. One of them has many varieties. The 
15 
utility function for these different varieties is assumed to 
be symmetrical and concave. Consumers maximize their utility 
functions subject to the budget constraints and choose their 
consumption level for each commodity. Firms maximize their 
profit functions given both the demand level for their 
products which is obtained by the utility maximization and the 
cost. The first order conditions give us their pricing rules. 
On the other hand, the Salop model assumes that consumer's 
tastes are uniformly spread over the unit circle. Each 
consumer is assumed to have a most-preferred brand 
specification. The distance from the most-preferred brand on 
the circle is thought as the utility cost. The consumer 
demand is decided such that a purchase of one unit from some 
brand is made if the maximized surplus of utility less price 
across brands is greater than the surplus from the other 
homogeneous good. Firms maximize their profits over the 
prices, given the demand level in terms of exogenous 
variables. 
The Dixit-Stiglitz model predicts that when the currency 
appreciation occurs, prices of imported brands decline 
proportionately while prices of domestic brands stay the same 
since prices are determined by wages in the domestic currency. 
This strong prediction arises since there are no interactions 
between the prices of the import brands and the domestic 
brands under the assumption that a behavior of each supplier 
does not affect industry price. Thus, since the cost 
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increases, the price also increases proportionately, so that 
the profit margins for both the domestic firms and the foreign 
firms are not affected by any changes in the currency. 
Introducing strategic interaction by a parametric conjectural 
variation, a slightly different prediction, which is similar 
to the one in the Cournot model, is given from the revised 
Dixit-Stiglitz model. A weakness of the Dixit-Stiglitz model 
is the assumption that an individual buys at least one of each 
brand. The Salop model discusses the case in which each 
consumer buys only one brand. The model predicts that an 
appreciation lowers domestic price less than proportionately. 
A change in relative prices of imported goods is smaller, if 
the number of firms in the industry is smaller or the 
substitutability among brands is lower. Dornbusch's attention 
is focused on the static model in which the determinants of 
domestic prices and pass-through coefficients are analyzed 
both for homogeneous and heterogeneous commodities. 
Krugman (1986) suggests that a dynamic treatment of 
pricing to market is essential, since the extent of pricing to 
market should vary due to whether economic agents believe that 
a change in the currency value is transitory or permanent. He 
presents three models which explain pricing to market in 
dynamic setting. The first model analyses the case in which 
pricing to market occurs from the supply side. When there are 
adjustment costs adherent to the speed of change in quantities 
sold by foreign firms, the extent of pricing to market depends 
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on how long the appreciation (or depreciation) lasts and on 
how persistent it is expected to be. If foreign firms 
perceive the appreciation (or depreciation) as a temporary 
shock, then they are more likely to price to market. The 
second reason for dynamics arises from slow adjustment of 
demand. Let us suppose that a firm sells a good during two 
periods. Because demand adjusts slowly to price change, the 
second period demand function depends on the price both during 
the first period and the second period. Then, there is a 
trade-off between the lower price in the first period and 
sales expansion in the second period. The question is whether 
the price in the first period falls more if a currency 
appreciation is expected in the second period than if it is 
expected only for the first period. Finally, when foreign 
firms do not want to hurt their reputation by changing their 
announced prices in advance, they may not change the prices as 
much as the exchange rate changes. If some customers who 
favor their supplies decide to enter the market, their demand 
function may be less elastic than one of general customers. 
If the firms do not care about their reputation, they can 
price somewhere along this less elastic demand function. The 
firms which stick to the announced prices in spite of the less 
elastic demand will have less incentives to lower their prices 
when their marginal cost declines due to appreciation. This 
price stickiness is the third reason for pricing to market. 
Krugman's idea is left without theoretical completeness 
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in his article. Several economists have developed dynamics of 
pricing to market issues along with Krugman's idea. 
Baldwin (1988) examines the supply-side effects in 
dynamic setting. Sharp variations in the exchange rate in the 
1980s may have caused parameter shifts in import price pass-
through equations. Baldwin introduces this hysteretic^ change 
after a large change in the exchange rate to explain the 
imperfect pass-through. He shows that when there exist 
considerable market entry sunk costs^, a large swing in the 
exchange rate can change market structure. Then, the change 
in the market structure does not disappear even after the 
exchange rate returns to the original level. He uses the 
Dixit-Stiglitz framework to model the Chamberlanian imperfect 
competition with the assumption that participants have perfect 
information over the exchange rate path. The mechanics is as 
follows. During a large appreciation of the domestic 
currency, discounted future profits for foreign firms become 
large enough to cover large market entry sunk costs, so that 
the number of foreign firms to enter the market rises. The 
foreign firms which can cover the costly entry expenses obtain 
^Hysteresis (which is a noun form of hysteretic) is a 
failure to return to the original situation even after the 
cause which induced the change is removed. 
^Market entry sunk costs are defined as costs which are 
not recouped when firms decide to retreat. They may be 
necessary to set up a distribution and service network or to 
bring the foreign product into conformity with domestic 
regulations. 
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the market share from the domestic firms which suffer from 
competition without àny cost reductions as the foreign firms 
can enjoy. Once they enter the market, in order for them to 
be viable, the anticipated profit path of the foreign firms 
does not have to be as large as the one before the entry 
decision. So if they can expect to cover their operating 
expenses, they will stay in business. As a result there are 
more (foreign) firms in the industry. That causes import 
prices to fall because of both the marginal cost reduction and 
the squeezed profit margin caused by more active competition. 
After the exchange rate moves back, the post-shock prices are 
permanently lower than the pre-shock prices even if the 
marginal costs return to the pre-shock level. Baldwin's 
hysteresis explains well the situation in the U.S. in the 
1980s. That is why the former appreciation lowered real 
import prices, while the later depreciation only partially 
forced them back. 
Froot and Klemperer (1989) point out that some foreign 
firms such as luxury German auto-makers exercised pricing to 
market behavior during the early 1980, such that when the 
dollar appreciated, prices of some imported commodities rather 
increased. As one of the attempts to analyze the behavior, 
they propose the model in which a future demand depends on a 
current market share. Since there are some reasons to believe 
that a current market share matters for future sales (such as 
consumers' loyalty), the market share function which depends 
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on a current price appears in the future profit function. For 
example, an increase in current prices reduces market shares 
in the current period, which also reduces the future profits 
as well. Hence, firms price less when the market share 
matters than when it does not. 
The effects of the exchange rate change on prices are 
composed of two elements: cost effects and real interest rate 
effects. When the domestic currency appreciates, the foreign 
firm's costs decline and that encourages the foreign firm to 
reduce the import prices. On the other hand, the current 
appreciation also makes the future profit less valuable than 
the current profit, when the appreciation is expected to be 
temporary, since the firm can not take advantage of cost 
reduction in the future so that the marginal value of 
acquiring the market share by aggressive pricing is not very 
large. The return on market share investment declines. 
Correspondingly the current prices tend to increase. The 
former cost effect and the latter real interest rate effect 
have the opposite effects on prices. Hence the effect of the 
exchange rate change on prices becomes ambiguous. However, if 
the value of the market share is large relative to costs, then 
real interest effect can dominate cost effect. In that case, 
the appreciation even increases prices. This may be the case 
in which prices of luxury German cars increased in the U.S. 
during the dollar appreciation. Compared to a temporary 
exchange rate change in which the effect on the prices are 
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ambiguous, a permanent exchange rate change indicates an exact 
negative sign since real interest rate is canceled out. 
Therefore, the current prices decrease (increase) more when a 
permanent appreciation (depreciation) in the exchange rate is 
expected than when a temporary exchange rate change is 
expected. 
Since the exchange rate change which is perceived as 
temporary can affect prices either positively or negatively in 
the model, the implication is not testable. What they show 
using data is that the degree of pricing to market depends on 
how the exchange rate change is perceived in terms of 
persistence. In early 1980s, expectations of unusually large 
future depreciation prevailed and lower pass-through was 
predicted. This means that import prices did not increase 
proportionately. However, the empirical testing does not show 
overwhelming evidence that the expected future depreciation 
influenced the degree of pricing to market. 
The last two papers, by Baldwin (1988) and Froot and 
Klemperer (1989) extend the theoretical work of pricing to 
market in dynamic framework. There has been more empirical 
work to investigate actual behavior by domestic and foreign 
firms about this issue. Several of them are discussed below. 
Mann (1986) examines the pricing behavior by U.S. 
exporters and foreign suppliers during the period 1977-85, 
using aggregate and disaggregate industry data. After 
estimating unit value of non-oil imports based on long-run 
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historical relationship between exchange rates and import 
prices and comparing it to actual data, she finds that actual 
import prices were sticky during the first half of the 1980s. 
Profit margins of foreign suppliers rose substantially during 
those periods. Exchange rate changes were passed through to 
non-oil import prices more fully, but more slowly, when the 
dollar depreciated. It suggests that the long-run 
relationship between exchange rate changes and import (or 
export) prices changed during the first half of the 1980s, 
maybe because of buying worldwide by multinational firms, 
newly established distribution networks in the U.S., and a 
greater ability to hedge foreign currency risks in 
international credit markets. Disaggregate data reinforce the 
lower profit margin during the depreciation period and the 
higher profit margin during the appreciation for importers. 
On the other hand, both aggregate and disaggregate data 
confirm that profit margins of U.S. exporters did not change 
as much as exchange rate changed. This may have caused a 
significant decline in U.S. competitiveness in the 
international market. For some export commodities, 
disaggregate data reveal that U.S. exporters increased profit 
margins even when the dollar appreciated. Along with 
industry-specific observation such as market structure or 
trade barriers, macroeconomic factors such as inflation in the 
source countries and relative growth in demand have affected 
the pricing and profit margins. 
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Hooper and Mann (1989) test the impact of changes in the 
exchange rate on U.S. import prices. They use aggregate data 
for the top nine suppliers of U.S. imports of manufactured 
goods which account for more than 75 percent of these imports. 
All data such as import prices, exchange rates, foreign 
capacity utilization and costs are weighted by current import 
share for each country. The results show that 50 to 60 
percent of the change in the nominal exchange rate is 
reflected in prices of manufactured imports with lags in the 
range of five to seven quarters, while short-run pass-through 
is about 20 percent. Separately, the bilateral trade between 
the U.S. and Japan is examined in the same framework. Running 
counter to the usual findings, the exchange rate pass-through 
coefficients for the Japanese exporters appear to be slightly 
higher than those for aggregate imports. The Japanese 
disaggregate data also show that the capacity utilization 
significantly affects import prices (in the U.S. from Japan), 
unlike the aggregate case, indicating that profit margins on 
Japanese exports respond to demand pressure at home and 
abroad. 
When pricing to market occurs in imperfectly competitive 
markets, prices are set apart from marginal costs by markups. 
To examine the level of pricing to market, it is essential to 
know how markups fluctuate. Knetter (1989) proposes a model 
which make it possible to differentiate marginal costs or 
markups from prices by assuming that marginal costs are common 
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across export destinations during the same period of time and 
by using a fixed-effects regression model. Export prices are 
regressed on time effects, country effects and exchange rates. 
Under the competitive market assumption, only the coefficient 
of time effects, which may vary with changes in marginal costs 
should be statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
possibility of price discrimination is detected by country 
specific effects, while coefficients on exchange rates provide 
evidence on how elasticities change along the demand function 
in different destination markets. 
He tests the model for U.S. and German exporters, using 
disaggregate data for several commodities. For the German 
exporters, the implication of stickiness of export prices to 
exchange rates is rejected and price discrimination to each 
market is confirmed. Whereas the U.S. exporters adjust dollar 
prices in a manner that amplifies the effect of exchange rate 
fluctuations on the local currency price, the German 
exporters stabilize the local currency price. In particular, 
this behavior by the German exporters is conspicuous in U.S. 
markets. 
Ohno (1989) estimates pass-through coefficients for 
Japanese export manufacturing industries compared to U.S. 
exporters. The method is directly estimating a cost function 
with two inputs in price equations. The pass-through 
coefficients are obtained from export price elasticities with 
respect to the real exchange rate for both countries. He 
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finds that there existed significant gaps in the rates of 
technical change in favor of Japan from late 1970s or early 
1980s through mid-SOs and the U.S. had the pass-through 
coefficient of 0.95 while Japan had the coefficient of 0.78 on 
average. Some evidence for price discrimination by Japanese 
exporters are found, while no U.S. exporters are engaged in 
such behavior. Furthermore, Japanese exporters raise yen 
prices more readily when the yen depreciates than lower them 
when the yen appreciates. He also supports some structural 
break which might have happened in the early 1980s in Japan, 
even though this may not be explained by hysteresis since the 
yen was neither extremely high nor low during that period. 
Giovannini (1988) clarifies the pricing policies of firms 
selling both domestically and abroad with volatile exchange 
rate under imperfect competition. He shows that how exchange 
rate uncertainty affects the law of one price depends on the 
currency of denomination of export prices and that deviation 
from the law of one price is explained by both exchange rate 
surprises and a price discrimination effect. Using data on 
Japanese domestic and export prices, exchange rate surprises 
are differentiated from price staggering and ex ante price 
discrimination. Price discrimination by Japanese exporters is 
reported. 
Marston (1989) and Branson and Marston (1989) also 
examine the pricing behavior by Japanese manufacturers. 
Marston presents the model in which Japanese manufacturers 
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maximize their profit functions composed of total revenues 
from both domestic and foreign sales and costs. The ratios of 
the export to domestic prices of each good are regressed on 
several variables as an empirical counterpart of the derived 
equation from the profit maximizing rules. Nominal exchange 
rate surprises are differentiated from permanent real exchange 
rate effects. Using seventeen products in the transport and 
electrical machinery industries, pricing to market behavior by 
Japanese exporters is revealed. Branson and Marston find 
variable markups of Japanese exporters in order to limit the 
effects of exchange rate changes on output. This is 
incompatible with U.S. exporters who bore their currency 
appreciation by unemployment and underproduction. 
The importance of exchange rate volatility as a 
determinant of export prices is analyzed by Mann (1989). In 
her model, exporters are assumed to maximize the expected 
utility of profits which is the sum of expected profits minus 
a function of the standard deviation of profits. The 
maximization of this expected utility yields the optimal price 
decision rules. It means that the higher the exporter's risk 
aversion is, the more likely it is that home-currency prices 
will increase with increased exchange risk, also the higher is 
the risk aversion of the importer, the more likely it is that 
the exporter absorbs some of the exchange risk. Several 
manufactured goods are chosen for U.S. , German and Japanese 
exporters. Exchange rates are calculated for individual 
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products using the destination weights. First, how export 
prices in their currencies change with exchange rate changes 
is reported. The U.S. disaggregate data show that U.S. 
exporters may have increased export prices since the beginning 
of 1985 for the markets where the effect of the dollar decline 
is strongest (Europe), while overall trends are to pursue more 
stabilization in the local currency prices where sharp 
exchange rate movements against the dollar exist. German 
exporters do not react to exchange rate changes, which may be 
explained by their dependence on the European market where 
they have strong buyer networks. These results are 
inconsistent with Knetter's result. Export price increases by 
the Japanese during the yen appreciation are most moderate 
particularly in the U.S. and Asia where they are losing 
competitiveness most rapidly. This may have been caused by 
their export prices denominated by destination market 
currencies. Secondly, the price competition by the Japanese 
and German exporters is detected, especially while the U.S. 
exporters charged much higher prices in the first half of the 
1980s. Finally, the export prices are regressed on the 
independent variables such as trends and standard deviations 
of the exchange rates. The results do not yield strong 
evidence that exchange rate trends or exchange risk affect 
export prices. There is weak evidence that U.S. exporters 
absorb some of the risk into their prices, which may be 
because they engaged in trade more with the Latin American 
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countries. German and Japanese exporters do not appear to 
incorporate exchange risk into their pricing strategies. 
As a whole, empirical findings suggest that world markets 
are imperfectly competitive and agents involved in the trade 
appear to vary their markups when exchange rate changes. The 
degree of pricing to market differs across the source 
countries. Japanese and German exporters tend to stabilize 
local prices to keep their competitiveness in the U.S. market. 
When the dollar invoice is common, the pass-through of the 
U.S. imports should be low. The denominated currencies may be 
playing a significant role. An evidence of hysteresis is 
found in Mann (1986). 
In order to clarify how exchange rate changes have 
influenced import prices and quantities in the U.S., some work 
related to the U.S. trade deficit is helpful. When the 
domestic currency depreciates, the conventional "J-curve" 
theory predicts that a sluggish response of export and import 
volumes is at first outweighed by valuation effects so the 
trade balance worsens. However, it improves as the changes in 
prices of export and import affect the domestic and foreign 
demand volumes. After the early 1985 when the dollar began to 
depreciate, the U.S. trade deficit did not improve as fast as 
expected. There is some research done about how prices and 
volumes respond to the exchange rate changes. Moffett (1989) 
empirically examines this J-curve effect. He estimates 
import/export prices and quantities separately, and uses these 
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equations for inferring trade balance adjustment path in the 
case of ten percent depreciation. The degree of exchange rate 
pass-through appears about 50 percent in eight quarters. In 
the regression of aggregate import volume on GNP and 
import/domestic prices, the price elasticity of demand for 
U.S. imports ranges between 0.59 and 0.69 in seven quarters. 
Each coefficient has a predicted sign and it is statistically 
significant. The adjusted for both price and quantity are 
very high. The predicted trade balance of the import sector 
shows that expenditures on imports typically increase 
following the dollar depreciations. The primary reason seems 
to be a result of relatively inelastic import volume. On the 
other hand, export earnings have been seen to rise only 
slightly during the same periods due to "increases" in export 
prices and the subsequent reductions induced in export volume. 
It is concluded that the long-run merchandise trade balance 
adjustment path is not similar to a J, but a sine wave, which 
returns to essentially pre-depreciation level. 
Krugman and Baldwin (1987) also analyze the puzzle of the 
U.S. trade deficit persistence. They point out that the U.S. 
did not experience a J-curve at least until the last quarter 
of 1986. Data of nonagricultural export and non-oil import 
volumes in the U.S. present more rapid increase in import 
volume and less rapid increase in export volume after 1985 
rather than before 1985. Since the lags of the exchange rate 
on quantity are statistically significant over nine quarters. 
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slow adjustment of quantity appears to explain why the J-curve 
did not happen by then. Since an empirical test shows that a 
demand shift due to expenditure change rather instantaneously 
affects import volume and price, the slow adjustment can not 
be supported by inelastic import supply curve in the short 
run®. However, the quick income effects and slow price 
effects can be readily acknowledged with a type of contracts; 
importers make long-term commitments about whom to buy from, 
but not about how much they will buy. This type of contracts 
appears to be realistic. 
Krugman and Baldwin conclude that trade balance 
improvements did not start by the end of 1986 because price 
and quantity respond very slowly. However, the following year 
have shown very slow improvement in the trade deficit. 
Arguments focusing on the hysteresis to explain the persistent 
deficit has been emphasized. The hysteresis is introduced by 
Baldwin and Krugman (1989) to explain the feedback to the 
exchange rate itself. They assume that the exchange rate 
always moves to balance payments. As has been argued by 
Baldwin (1988), the dollar appreciation in the first half of 
1980s, which followed a large capital inflow altered the 
market structure (i.e., this large appreciation enables 
foreign firms to compensate sunk cost for entry in terms of 
^Hooper disagrees in a sense that if firms predict income 
effects, but not price changes, then their findings are 
explained. 
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the future profit path and the market will be more 
competitive even after the exchange rate reversed). Due to 
the appreciation and more foreign firms in the domestic 
market, the total import value rises. In order to balance the 
payment the currency has to depreciate even beyond the 
original level of the exchange rate before the appreciation 
starts. Their view explains that a cause of the persistent 
current trade deficit is not just a matter of lagged effects 
of exchange rates. Rather, import structure altered after the 
large appreciation and this worked unfavorably for the U.S. 
trade deficit. The assumption used in Baldwin (1988) for 
perfect foresight of the exchange rate path is replaced with 
the i.i.d. stochastic assumption of the exchange rate, which 
seems more realistic. They also show that the hysteresis 
presented in Baldwin (1988) is applicable to the multi-
industry case. That is, the aggregation does not reduce a 
large exchange rate shock effect. 
Dixit (1989) extends the models of hysteresis by Baldwin 
(1986) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989). Baldwin assumes 
perfect foresight of real exchange rate, while Baldwin and 
Krugman treat that as a random variable which is independently 
and identically distributed. Dixit introduces real exchange 
rate with a Brownian motion, in which volatility of exchange 
rate can reveal a cause of hysteresis. In other words, the 
existence of exchange rate volatility reinforces hysteretic 
effects. His model is different from others in terms of 
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dealing with competitive market and proving the existence of 
hysteresis in that environment. The striking result is that 
the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices is very 
close to one in the phases where foreign firms enter or exit 
and about zero otherwise. 
Krugman (1989) discusses extensively why large exchange 
rate fluctuations have so little effect on economies. The 
reason seems obvious that foreign exporters exercise pricing 
to market. He agrees with Dixit's explanation; which is that 
the existence of sunk costs creates a range of exchange rates 
such as nothing happens if exchange rates stay in this range. 
Uncertainty concerning future exchange rates reinforces the 
effect, so that the range in which no firm enters or exits is 
even wider. This is similar to option pricing. In option 
pricing, the ratio of the market price at which an option is 
exercised to the strike price is higher, the greater is the 
market volatility. In the sunk cost model, firms wait and see 
to decide whether they enter (or exit), when expected future 
profit path is just as much as sunk cost (or variable cost) if 
exchange rate largely varies. As a result of large exchange 
rate shocks, a number of participating foreign firms is 
altered and hysteresis is induced. 
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III. OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
As we have seen in the last chapter, much research have 
been concentrated on pricing to market behavior by exporters. 
The research related to the import side has been limited to 
hysteresis issue. While there has been considerable work on 
exporters' behavior in imperfectly competitive circumstances, 
it can not be well-explained that we find little research on 
importers. This study shows how domestic economic variables 
are affected when import prices change. Also, it is shown 
that market structure in the economy and import restrictions 
including a possibility of "invisible" restrictions influence 
how these variables are affected. 
We develop a model which describes factors that affect 
import prices and quantities in Japan and to empirically 
examine whether those factors are really influential. Players 
in the models are domestic producers and importers. How they 
behave depends on how each player perceives himself; as a 
price-taker, as a member involved in the Cournot competition, 
or a monopolist. Moreover, the players are subject to the 
trade policies by the government or the private sector. The 
players may observe their trade environments subject to the 
implicit restrictions on import quantities or on import shares 
in domestic markets, or the informal intention of the 
government to impose import restrictions in the future if 
import quantities go beyond a desirable level. These possible 
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cases are considered in the model and the model predicts how 
the internal economic variables should change with each 
assumption. A part of the predictions is empirically tested 
and the results are compared to the theoretical predictions. 
We expect that this will show the characteristics of the 
domestic economic environments. 
As some studies in literature have shown, there are pass-
through effects of exchange rate changes even though they are 
slow and imperfect. The large swings of the yen during the 
1980s should have revealed the relations between domestic 
price, import quantities or market shares and import prices 
through the coefficient of import prices on the dependent 
variables. 
In the next chapter, a model is presented. Data and 
empirical results are summarized in the following chapters. 
Finally, some comments will conclude Part I. 
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IV. MODEL 
There are two types of suppliers in the country (Japan), 
domestic producers and importers. The number of each supplier 
is n and f, respectively. Marginal costs of importers and 
producers are assumed to be constant and expressed by P and C, 
respectively. Both of them are in terms of the Japanese 
currency. An inverse demand function is; 
R  -  G  {  Q )  
where R and Q are domestic wholesale price and quantity 
demanded. 
Homogeneity of imports and domestically produced goods is 
assumed and total quantity consumed is a sum of imports and 
domestic products, i.e., 
f-l n-X 
<? = E + E ^1-
i-0 i-0 
Then, profit functions for a representative importer and 
producer are, respectively, defined below as and n^. 
f-1 i3-l 
- [G(mo + (1) 
i-1 i-0 
f-1 n-1 
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where m, and q. are the i th importer and producer, 
respectively, when i=0,...,f-l or n-1. Maximizing their 
profits in the Cournot competition and assuming symmetry among 
each group, 
2?® - P (3) 
e f - s *  
Rc c (4) 
t n - s  
S  -  S *  -  1  -  S  
where e is demand elasticity with respect to price. Combining 
(3) and (4), 
gc . efnP + rtC(i-ef) 
f P  +  n C  
R C  .  ( 6 )  
e f + e n - 1  
Assuming a constant elasticity demand function, we find that 
32" > 0, ^  < 0, <0, -^ > 0, 
S P  d C  d f  d n  
flgC __ 
and the sign of depends on the sign of (P-C). 
Producers gain their market share when an import price or the 
number of producers rises, and when marginal cost or the 
number of importers falls. Also, the following inequalities 
show that the more competitive suppliers are, the less their 
profit margin becomes, which reduces the wholesale price. 
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34; > 0, -^  > 0, -^  < 0, < 0, jgz <0 
3 P  d c  d f  ' 3c d n  
A lower cost to importers will expand importers' margin, and 
thus they tend to decrease prices. Producers will find 
themselves in disadvantageous position if their cost to supply 
is higher compared to that for importers. Thus, they lose the 
price competition and have to decrease their market share. 
The wholesale price should decline. Since the wholesale price 
decreases, the demand for both imported and domestically 
produced goods rises; overall, q falls while m increases. In 
the case of a decrease in costs for producers, the situation 
is reversed. The decreased cost will raise producers' profit 
margin and producers will decrease prices. Importers are now 
at a disadvantage in the price competition vis-a-vis the 
producers, and will lose the market share. Thus, q rises 
while m falls. 
Figure 1 presents the above argument. £, and fg are 
importers and producers' reaction functions, respectively. 
When import price rises, shifts back to £^'. When domestic 
production costs rises, shifts back to Kg'" The equilibrium 
point moves to B or C. The elasticity of wholesale price 
with respect to import price is less than one as follows. 
d R "  P  f P  . < i  
d P  R °  f P + n C  
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Under perfect competition or Bertrand competition, 
wholesale price level should be equal to either C or P 
depending on which is lower. This is observed from equation 
(3) and (4) if we substitute infinitely large e. A slight 
decrease in import price will wipe away domestic production.* 
The elasticity of wholesale price with respect 
m Producer's 
reaction 
function 
Importer's 
reaction 
function 
Figure 1. m (import) and q (domestic production) in the 
Cournot competition without any trade 
restriction 
*The arguments in this section are heavily based on the 
assumption of constant marginal cost of import and domestic 
production. If increasing marginal cost is assumed, a small 
change in import price does not cause a drastic change in 
market share. Consumption for imports and domestically 
produced goods under perfect competition, for example, will be 
determined at the point where marginal costs of each product 
are equalized, so both products will be consumed at the 
equilibrium. 
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to import price equals unity. In the case of importers and 
producer's collusion the joint profit function becomes as 
follows: 
f-1 n-1 f-1 
Tï-^- [^(yno+g /n^+go+p -ÂI 
f—1 il-1 /3-1 
+ <?l) (90+1] <7i) • 
1-1 1-1 i-1 
Their decision rule is the same as monopolist's. As in the 
case of perfect competition, if import price falls, they 
switch all domestic production to import. The first order 
conditions give 
^ min [ P  ,  C  ]  .  
e-1 
Hence, market share function is very sensitive to import 
price. Wholesale price does not depend on number of importers 
or producers. If importers or producers collude within each 
group, the solution simply become equation (3), (4), (5) and 
(6) with f=l or n=l respectively. In the case that n (or f) 
is endogenous, if there exists a profit for domestic producers 
(importers), more firms will enter the market until the profit 
becomes zero. So, the wholesale price level is 
R  - min [ C, P  ]  .  
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If f is endogenous, 
R  - min [ P ,  —^ C ] . 
e n - 1  
Again, only one of them, importers or producers, will dominate 
the market. 
A. Invisible Quota and Tariff 
A government can restrict imports using quota or tariff. 
If there exists a quantitative restriction for import such as 
m > m., then the profit function for an importer becomes 
constrained while the profit function for a producer is the 
same as (2). The profit function for a importer is as follows 
with the constraint. 
f-1 n~l 
71^ - [G ( ^ 0 + 2] + 2] Qj ) - "k 
i-1 i-0 
subject to 
f-1 
In ^ (1)/ 
i-0 
Maximizing both the Lagrangian function which is derived from 
an objective function for importers subject to the constraint, 
and (2), we obtain the first order conditions. When the 
constraint is binding, the import level is determined from the 
equation for the constraint. A typical importer is 
constrained such as m>fmQ. The constraint and the first order 
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condition from (2) gives 
This implies that the wholesale price is a function of n, m 
and C, which are exogenously given. Since q = { Q(R)-m }/n, q 
is a function of n, iti, and C. So is S, since S = nq/Q. 
Rewriting the above equation and assuming a constant 
elasticity of demand 
J""- C. (8) 
t n - S { n , m ,  C )  
Then, 
d R °  ^  Q  d R ^  ^  Q  >  Q  
Similarly, 
d n  d m  d C  
0, i|f < 0 and < 0. 
an as dc 
A quantitative import restriction separates variables of 
importers, such as P and f, from the domestic economy. 
Wholesale price, market share, demand, and quantities supplied 
by importers or producers are not affected by import price or 
by the number of importers. Figure 2 shows the mechanics. 
Importers simply do not have any choice. Producers decide the 
production level given iii. A reduction in m (to m') increases 
domestic production. An increase in domestic production cost 
shifts in producers' reaction function, which reduces 
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production level (A-»D) . 
When in is binding, the domestic market share in the simple 
Cournot case, 8^=, is less than S® which is the market share 
with quota ( gjjj- < 0) . Domestic production with quota, q®, is 
larger than q^ without quota. Hence, profit margin of 
domestic producers with quota is greater than that in Cournot 
case from (4) and (8). The profit margin of import (per unit) 
with quota is also greater than that without quota while 
overall profit is ambiguous. 
A tariff is another well-known method to restrict 
m/f 
m'/f 
Figure 2. m (import) and q (domestic production) in the 
Cournot competition under the quantitative 
restriction where m/f is import level for each 
importer 
43 
imports. When the government imposes a tariff, r, the profit 
function for importers becomes 
f-1 n-l _ 
- [6(^ 0 + + <&+ I] gl - f(l+T)Lmo. (9) 
Maximizing (9) and (2) with respect to m^ and q^, we obtain the 
following first order condition. 
R t P{i+X) (10) 
e f - s *  
R  "  — c. (11) 
e n - s  
Combining (10) and (11), 
g t  _  e f i i P j l + x )  +  n C { l - e f )  ^ ^ 2 )  
£p(l+x) + n c  
and 
„ t e[fP(l+T) +  n C ( l - B f ) ]  
e f  +  e n - l  '  '  
The market share function, (12) is an increasing function 
T. So is (13). When r rises, m declines and q rises. The 
arguments are similar to changes in m and q when P changes in 
the Cournot case. The profit margin for importers is less 
than that in the Cournot case, while the profit margin for 
producers is larger. 
n or C affects market shares in either case (with quota 
or tariff). The magnitudes of changes in market shares are 
different under different type of the restriction. An 
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increase in C shifts back to ij' in Figure 2 ,  assuming that 
A is an original equilibrium for both cases (i.e., tariff and 
quota had the same effect). Under the quantitative 
restriction, the new equilibrium point is at D. With the 
tariff, an equilibrium point will be somewhere on above D 
where crosses an importer's reaction function. In both 
cases, market share falls but the degree is larger with the 
quantitative restriction. A fall in C shifts outward, so 
that the constraint m is not binding any more in the case of 
quota. Hence, the equilibrium point is determined by two 
reaction functions. In that case, tariff and quota have the 
same effect on market share. When n falls, domestic producers 
become less competitive and lose their market shares. Market 
shares with quota are larger than those with tariff. There is 
no difference between quota and tariff when n rises. 
The (non-) equivalence of tariff and quota in 
oligopolistic markets needs to be discussed. In the Bertrand 
case, import quota has very different effects than tariff. 
Quota prevents foreign firms from competing in the domestic 
market and enables prices and firms' profits to be larger than 
those with tariff (Helpman and Krugman, 1989; Krishna, 1989). 
Under Cournot competition, quota gives the same results as 
what happens with tariff except the distributional effect of 
quota rent. Hwang and Mai (1988) presents this issue using a 
conjectural variation approach and conclude that the domestic 
price is lower (higher) under quota if market is less (more) 
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competitive than the Cournot case. 
If importers are perfectly competitive, tariff and quota 
are distinctively different. With a tariff, importers will 
import foreign products as much as they want and it will force 
domestic producers to decrease their production level up to 
the point where the marginal cost of domestic production is 
equal to the world price plus tariff. On the other hand, 
quota can not eliminate the market power by domestic 
producers. The domestic producers will maximize the profit by 
still choosing the production level at which their perceived 
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost after the demand for 
their products is cut off by the amount of quota, since 
imports as many as quota will be consumed in the domestic 
market. The tariff leads no market power of the domestic 
producers as long as there are any imports while the quota 
does not eliminate domestic firms' market power since the 
level of imports is predetermined independently of the price 
charged by domestic firms. Domestic prices with quota will 
be higher. Quota is obviously inferior to tariff. 
Specifically in the Cournot case, a properly chosen T can 
give us exactly the same effects with a quota, m. That is, 
equating S° as a function of m to S* in equation (12) , we will 
obtain T under which the market shares with quota and tariff 
are equalized. Then, from (8) and (11), wholesale price is 
the same, which gives us the same levels of demand. 
Accordingly, m and q are the same. This confirms Hwang and 
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Mai since the conjectural variation is assumed to be zero in 
the Cournot. 
B. Market Share Regulations 
Market share regulations are often practiced to protect 
domestic industries. There are two types of the market share 
regulations considered here. A government can utilize a 
tariff to stabilize market share by domestic producers at a 
target level. In the first discussion, firms treat tariff 
exogenously, since the level is decided by the government. In 
the other case, the tariff is endogenously treated, after 
firms realize the government policy. First, let us assume 
that firms do not have information for the regulation and a 
current import market share is higher than a level which the 
government considers desirable. The government sets up a 
target market share after observing the current economic 
variables and imposes the tariff which can attain the target 
level. In other words, the level of tariff is always adjusted 
to changes in the other exogenous variables in order to keep a 
certain market share to domestic producers. Equation (12) 
shows that the tariff level, T, changes the domestic market 
share. The government uses T to keep S fixed, so that solving 
T with respect to S and the other exogenous variable, we set, 
-  S'^{fP+nC) + e£n(C-P) -  nC 
fpun-s"^)  
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Where is a target level of the domestic market share. 
Plugging (14) back into (10), we have only one equation to 
determine wholesale price, i.e., 
RMSX en g, (15) 
tn-S^ 
In order to keep dS^=0, T has to be adjusted whenever 
other exogenous variables such as P, C, n and f change. The 
relationship between T and these variables are obtained as S 
and T move in opposite direction to keep S at certain level. 
^ < 0 ,  | 1 > 0 ,  | i > 0 a n d - | i < 0 .  
For example, if decrease in P intends to decrease S, then T 
has to rise to discourage imports. 
Since wholesale price R is expressed without P or f in 
equation (15), wholesale price is again separated from import 
market. That is, whether import price goes up or down, or 
whether import market is more or less competitive does not 
affect wholesale prices. Since the constraint is binding, the 
tariff increases with the objective to maintain for 
domestic producers, which means that P or f does not matter as 
determinants of market share any more. Before the tariff is 
implemented, P was too low to exclude more imports from the 
domestic markets; so T will adjust to increase import price 
after tariff to the level which can be compatible with 
domestically determined variables such as C or n. That is, 
only competitiveness in the producers' market and cost of 
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domestic products influence wholesale price. The more 
competitive producers are or the lower the cost of domestic 
producers is, the less costly it is to buy products in the 
wholesale market. The higher target of the market share of 
domestic producers will induce wholesale price to rise. 
Quota, tariff and this market share regulation with an 
exogenous T can influence economic variables exactly the same 
way. Equations (8), (11), and (15) show that if the market 
share is the same in each case, wholesale price is also the 
same. Then, the demand for the sum of imports and domestic 
products stays the same and so does m and q since the market 
share is the same. By choosing proper T and m, the three 
model results in the same level of endogenous variables, R, Q, 
S, m and q. 
In the above case, the government alters a tariff level 
whenever the exogenous environments change in order to leave 
the market share stable. If all agents know the behavioral 
rule of the government, they use that information to maximize 
their profits. That is, if the government repeatedly 
implements a tariff such as above, every agent may recognize 
that market share should be kept at a certain level (or if a 
law directly limits imports as ratio quota (versus volume 
quota which was already discussed)), domestic producers' 
objective function will include total quantity supplied as a 
function of and q, not m, assuming that the constraint is 
binding. Then, after observing domestic production level, the 
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government enforces the ratio quota on imports. As a result, 
domestic producers act as Stackelberg leaders while importers 
as followers.7 The profit function for domestic producers 
becomes 
"î" [G( (% ) + % + i] ?i) % (16) 
3 j-i i-i 
f-1 J. ii-i 
s ince  — J] g^.  (17) 
1-0 " i-0 
Maximizing (16) with respect to q^, 
j^usN _ (18) 
en-1 
Producers know that if they increase their supply by one 
i _ g T  
unit, then importers must increase imports by —gr • Their 
perceived marginal revenues are more steeply sloped, which 
decreases their supply. Total supply of producers decline. 
Again, wholesale price level is independent of P, which shows 
that there will be no pass-through effects. Compared to the 
previous analysis in which r was exogenously determined, the 
levels of q and m are lower.® This reduced supply increases 
wholesale price. Since wholesale price is higher, the profit 
margins for both producers and importers are larger. From 
^See Parks and Lapan (1991) in the case of simultaneous 
play and unbinding constraint. 
°This result is consistent with Hwang and Mai (1988) and 
Mai and Hwang (1989). 
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(18), it is shown that wholesale price rises when cost rises 
or the number of producers declines. The effects of cost and 
competitiveness on wholesale price are larger in this case 
than in the previous case with an exogenous r. 
C. A Threat for the Future Import Restriction 
Let us consider one more case. In order to protect 
domestic production, a government may impose import 
restriction in the future if the current import share is 
larger than a certain level. If the government has repeated 
such threat to importers, importers may have used the 
information to maximize their profit. The similar 
consideration in the case of voluntary export restraints 
(VERS) was contributed by Yano (1989). Yano analyzes how 
foreign exporting firms behave in the current period when they 
expect that importing countries may impose VERs in the future 
in order to protect domestic firms. The more common VERs 
become, the more likely it is that exporters take into account 
these expectations into their behavioral rule. If an 
exporting firm's share in the future after VERs are imposed, 
is assigned proportionately to it's current share, the 
competition to acquire market share in the current period 
becomes intensified since the foreign firm's marginal profit 
from an additional current sale increases as the expectation 
increases. Thus, the foreign firm will raise their current 
sales, while domestic firm reduces his sale. As a result, the 
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expectation of future VERs reduces the current profit of 
domestic firms. Hence, planned protection for domestic firms 
by VERS will be offset by lowered profit of domestic firms 
before VERs. 
In our case, each importer expects that if the government 
implements import restriction in the future, its market share 
will be allocated proportionally to its current share. That 
gives some incentives to importer to increase the current 
import, while increased import may raise the probability that 
a quota is imposed on imports. Let us assume a two-period 
model. The probability of the government regulation in the 
second period is /l(0 < À < 1), which may be a function of 
quantities imported and domestically produced in the first 
period.' It is plausible that the larger is the level of 
imports in the first period, the more likely it is that the 
government will restrain that in the next period and vice 
versa for the domestically produced goods. The probable level 
of import restriction, M is defined as a function of imports 
in the first period. The larger is the level of import in the 
first period, the higher will be the level of import 
restriction. When the regulation is not implemented in the 
second period, importers and producers will maximize their 
'/< can be a function of the market share of foreign 
goods. In order to make a calculation simpler, À is defined 
to be a linear function of 
f n 
Z m, and Z q,. 
i=l i=l 
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profits at the usual Cournot level. When the regulation 
occurs in the second period, their profit maximizing solution 
will be the same as when a quota is imposed. Their expected 
profit functions are as follows: 
7ï„ - [A ^ ) 
i-1 i-1 i-1 T-v 0 
Z^^i 
i-1 
+ (19) 
i-1 i-1 
n g -  Tt °g + g°)v:^ + [1-A, g", g") ] n (20) 
i-1 i-1 i-1 i-1 
where f is a discount factor for the second period and 
superscripts, 0, Q and C respectively signify the first 
period, quota, and Cournot, respectively. J is a 
representative importer. Taking derivatives with respect to 
m°j and q°j, respectively. 
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where MS"—^—. 
Let us assume that the second order conditions are 
satisfied. Since dAjdq. < 0, the second term of the right-
hand-side in equation (22) is negative, which implies the 
first term to be positive. It means that quantity produced 
domestically should be smaller when the second period is taken 
into account. The inside of the first parentheses in equation 
(21) is negative. When a importer increases the supply, the 
sum of domestic products marketed will fall.Hence, if more 
imports in the first period increase the possibility for 
import restriction in the second period, then the first term 
in the brackets is negative. The profit of an importer in the 
second period rises when he increases imports in the first 
period, holding the total imports constant (in order not to 
increase the probability of quota in the second period), since 
his assigned market share and the quota level itself in the 
future will increase. The second term in the brackets is 
positive. If the negative term dominates the positive term in 
the brackets, the first term of the right-hand-side has to be 
positive and imports will be smaller compared to the simple 
J (m,, • • • , m., q-, • • • , q ) =077 /am,=R-P+R • m,=0 
Hence, (9J/3m^)dm^+' * * + (9J/9m^)dmf+(9J/3qJdq,+ * • • + (3J/0q^)dq^=O 
Defining 3J/3m-=- • •=dJ/dm,=dJ/dq.= - • •=9J/3q„ by symmetry, 
^dq./dm^=-(dJ/dm^) / (dJ/dq^) < 0. 
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Cournot case. If the second term in the brackets (positive) 
dominates the first term (negative), imports will be larger. 
In the former case, the perceived possibility of future import 
restriction induces the reduction in the current production 
and import. In the latter case, domestic production in the 
second period falls, while import in the second period rises. 
In Yano's model, the probability of quota imposition is not 
dependent on the first period choice variables, but a simple 
parameter. Hence, the ambiguity in the signs is eliminated. 
However, when the difference in profits between when the quota 
is enforced and when it is not is large, importers should 
recognize the significant damage to increase the probability 
of quota imposition by taking an aggressive strategy in the 
first period. Therefore, they may take a less aggressive 
strategy, i.e., they rather reduce the import quantity in the 
first period. 
Let us assume that the probability of the government 
import restriction linearly depends on imports and domestic 
production in the first period, i.e., 
k - kia^ni i  - g°) 
2^ i-1 
where a and yff are constant numbers. 
f n 
Z m? positively and Z q9 negatively affect the probability 
i=l i=l 
of restriction. Then, the profit functions for an importer 
and a producer are respectively. 
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i-l 2^ 
+ - pggf) [j;0(]?(;g;n^ ) + ^  g°) - P] ;n,°) 
i-l i-l i-l i-l 0 i"l 
^i 
+ (l-A.(a^jn° -  <7°) )  gf)  mf -  Pni j ] ]  (23) 
7t g - m° + g°) g° - Cgj 
i-l 1-1 
+ ô[X(a]^ini - <3"°) ] [i? ®(Af(^ iHi) + ^  ^F)  Q[f  ~  Cgf]  
i-l i-l i-l i-l 
+ (1-A, (a m° - ?i) ] t-R ^i'^ + 53 '^f ~ ] • (24) 
i-l i-l i-l i-l 
Maximizing (23) and (24) with respect to m°, qf, mf , q°, mf, 
and q9, we have the solutions as follows. m°, q? , and r" are 
the solutions with a quota, m^, q®, and R° are those in the 
simple Cournot case. From the first order conditions with 
respect to m? and q?, 
(P + A) (25) 
t f -S* 
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(c + B) (26) 
tn-S 
where 
A - S* 'a(7t^ - TC®) - à^RO' W-bt^iRO-P)  ^  (^+-^) fm 
B = Ô*'P(%g - T t q ) ,  
and A > 0 and B > 0 are assumed. Equation (25) and (26) give 
us 
_ efÇP+A) + en{C+B) /g?)  
ef+en-1 
Q R  _ efn{P+A) +n(c+B) ( l-ef)  (gg) 
f ( P + A ) + i 3 ( C + S )  
If importers anticipate significant loss in their profits 
in the case when the government imposes a quota in the future, 
they will import less in the current period and that tends to 
increase the market share by producers. If producers 
anticipate considerable gain with the future quota, they will 
produce less in the current period and increase the 
probability of the quota, which will reduce the market share 
by producers. These behaviors by both importers and producer 
to supply less quantities in the current market push up the 
wholesale price level. 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 summarize the results in the Cournot 
competition. 
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Table 1. Predictions for R in the Cournot case 
3R/3P 0R/ac 
no regulat ion — >0 ——= >0  
en+ef-1 tn-S( .n ,  f ,  P,  C)  
volumequota 0  > 0  
en-S(n,m,C)  
tar i f f  e f ( l + x )  > o  
en+ef- l  tn-S(n,  f ,  P,  C,^)  
ra t io  quotaiexog)  0  — > 0  
en-S ^  
rat io  guota(end)  0  > 0  
ei2-l 
threat  ^— >0 >0 
zn+zf~l  tn-S{n,  f ,  P,C,x*)  
* X means several exogenous variables such as a, 0, 0, 5, M. 
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Table 2. Predictions for market shares in the Cournot case 
as/ap as/ac 
no regulat ion nCf{en+tf- l )  ( fP+nC)^ >0 
nPf( tn+ef- l )  
(  fP+nC) 2 <0 
volume quota  
tar i f f  nCfUn+ef-1)  (1+t)  nPf(^-*- t f -D (1+t)  
[ f f  ( l + T )  +nc]  2  [ff(l+T)+ac]2 
rat io  quota  (exog)  
ra t io  quota  {end)  
threat  n(C+B) f  (en+ef-i)  
[ f ( P + A )  + n ( C + B ) ] 2  
> 0  n{P-^A) f {zn+tf - l )  
[ f ( P + A )  + n ( C + B ) ] 2  
<0 
* As already explained, comparing this magnitude with tariff's 
case in which both cases originally give the same results 
(i.e., import with quota, m equals to import with tariff), the 
magnitude of |as/ac| is the same for both cases with quota and 
tariff when C increases from the original equilibrium where 
both cases give the same results. The magnitude of \dS/dC\ is 
less with quota. 
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Table 3. Predictions for import quantities in the Cournot 
case 
3m/0P am/ac 
no 2R'+qR" -  (R'*inR")  
regulat ion [ {2x'+qR") + (R'+mR") ]  R'  [  {2R'+gR") + {R'+mR") ]  
vo lume quota  0 0 
tar i f f  (2R'*QR") (1+T)  XQ R'+rm" 
R'  [  (2R'+qR") + {R'+mR") ]  R'  [  (2R'+gR") + (R'+mR") ] 
ra t io  quota  {exog)  0 i < 0 
[ (R^'+qR^')  +  . (2Jg/+gR//) ] 
rat io  quota(end)  0 < 0 
threat  
* The expressions for the explicit solutions are complicated. 
With some conditions the results maintain the same signs as 
ones in the case of no regulation. 
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V. ESTIMATION METHOD AND DATA 
A. Method 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 in the last chapter show how import 
price and domestic cost affect wholesale price, market share 
and import quantity under the Cournot competition. If there 
exist some type of quota such as ratio or volume quota, the 
variables characterizing import market such as number of 
importers or import price do not influence wholesale price nor 
market share. That is, a large appreciation (depreciation) 
which is revealed as a large decline (increase) in import 
price, P, does not change wholesale price or market share. On 
the other hand, wholesale price is sensitive to a change in 
domestic cost under any trade restrictions. The negative 
relationship between import quantity and domestic cost is 
distinct under a ratio quota. Competitiveness in each market 
is measured through the number of domestic producers or 
importers. The more competitive a market is, wholesale price 
will be lower. If markets are competitive or collusive, 
wholesale prices are independent from the number of producers 
or importers. 
Due to data shortage, possibility of invisible tariff 
(which is thought as distributional costs for imports) or 
threat for the future import restriction is not tested here. 
Wholesale prices used are indexed and how to measure a threat 
by the government is not considered. An import price, P, can 
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be separated into three parts, since 
P - e JP* ( 1 + T ) 
where e is the yen value per unit of foreign currencies and T 
is tariff rate. The following three equations are fitted. 
Ln R - «g + Oj Ln P* +«2 Ln e  + Uj  Ln (1+x) + Ln C (29) 
Ln s - Po + Pi Ln P + P2 Ln C (30) 
Ln I  -  Ln P + y2 Ln C (31) 
where R is wholesale price in yen, eP*, import price in yen, 
MS, market share by domestic producers, I, quantity imported, 
and C, nominal wage in each industry. 
In competitive markets, a,=a2=a3=a^=l. A market share will 
be very sensitive to changes in P*, e, T, or C. The expected 
signs are positive for and negative for The import 
demand curves coincide with the demand curves when eP* is less 
than domestic marginal cost, or zero when eP* is larger. 
Hence, y^<0 and Yi>^- On the other hand, if importers and 
producers collude, they behave like one monopoly. 
Descriptions for the coefficients are the same as the above 
competitive case expect that ci!g>0 (if the data is not 
indexed). In both cases, numbers of importers and producers 
do not affect any economic variables. 
Under oligopolistic market settings, we expect that 0<a.|, 
Qij, û!3<1, K2>0 and yffg/ Ki<0. When there is import 
restriction such as volume quota or ratio quota, import price 
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does not affect wholesale price or market share (a^=a2=a3=;ff,=0) . 
With any kind of quotas, import price does not change import 
quantity (i.e., x^=0). A change in domestic cost clarifies 
whether the quota is ratio or volume depending on the sign of 
h or Kg. 
The expected signs for each coefficient are summarized in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. Expected signs for coefficients 
«1 «2 "3 «4 A Kl 
Competition 
Collusion 1 1 1 1 + + 
Cournot 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 + - - + 
Volume quota 0 0 0 + 0 - 0 0 
Ratio quota 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 -
As mentioned in the second chapter, the previous 
researches show that there are time lags until a change in 
exchange rates is transmitted to import prices. The slow 
adjustment of wholesale price to import price is also 
considered in this model. 
A possibility of endogenous P* can not be ignored. 
Japanese market may be large enough to influence world market. 
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If P* is exogenous, we expect that 0:^=0(2. If not, the model 
has to be altered to a simultaneous system, defining both P* 
and R as endogenous variables. 
Feenstra (1989) finds the symmetric pass-through of 
tariff and exchange rate on U.S. prices of Japanese cars. 
Since there was significant change in Japanese tariff rates 
during the first half of 1980s after the Tokyo round, it is 
testable. Equation (29) is slightly changed. 
1 1 
Ln - «0+^ ôi n j Lne^.^+a^ Ln{l+t) c+a, LnCf.+ Uf. 
i-0 i-0 
where ~ iid (0,a^), and The symmetry is 
tested by « Lags, i's go from 1 through 1." 
Then, in order to test the symmetry 
1 1 1  
LnRf.-aQ+Y^ b^LnPc-i+ i )  Lnd+x)  ^iLnef- .^+Lnd+x)  g]  
i-0 i-0 i-0 
+«4 LnCf.+U(. .  
The symmetry will be tested by a t-statistics with the 
hypothesis that 
In the above arguments, we have ignored the role of f or 
"Following Feenstra, lags on tariffs are not considered. 
In his model, the revenue of Japanese auto-makers depends on 
expected exchange rate and the expected exchange rate is 
assumed to be a function of the current and past spot rates. 
In this paper, wholesale prices are determined from the profit 
maximization process with exogenously given import prices. It 
may have been appropriate to assume lags on tariffs along with 
lags on exchange rates because of the time lag for complete 
effects of both variables on wholesale prices. 
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n, assuming no entry or exit. It is tested for n, using 
production concentration ratio of the largest three producers. 
The larger (smaller) the ratio is, the less (more) competitive 
the market is. It is assumed that the production 
concentration ratio substitutes n in such way that if the 
ratio is large, then n are small. The available production 
concentration ratios for each commodity (commodity specific 
concentration ratios) are only for 1980. Industry 
concentration ratios (concentration ratios for groups of 
commodities) are available at three dates (1982, 1984 and 
1986). Hence, we cannot exactly test the effects of the 
number of firms on wholesale price for each commodity. 
Because that requires the concentration ratio for every 
quarter. Hence, the following equation can not be directly 
estimated. 
Ln R - PQ + Ln P + P2 CR3 Ln P + p2 Ln C 
-  P f j  +  J i L n P + p ^ L n C  
where f s and CR3 is the production concentration 
ratio of the largest three firms in the market for each 
commodity (or industry). Since p^ and Pj can not be identified 
from f if CRj does not vary in the above equation, combining 
all data across each commodity, the following equation is 
actually estimated. 
Ln (32) 
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where i and t are indicators for commodity and time, and i and 
t go from 1 through n and T, respectively. A change in 
wholesale price due to import price change is 
- Pi + Pj CJ?3 > 0. dLnP 
That is, wholesale price is expected to rise when import price 
rises with p,>0 and P2<0. The latter is because the more 
concentrated a industry is, the smaller the wholesale price 
response will be. P3>0 is expected. 
Equation (32) is estimated using the feasible generalized 
least squares estimator for both cross-section and time-series 
data. Our data are time-series data of sixteen commodities 
(or five industries). Each commodity seems to have large 
variation in the scales of all variables. The variance of e,^ 
can be allowed to vary across i. Then, the model becomes 
heteroscedastic for each commodity. In equation (32), the 
error component, e.^, is decomposed. That is, e.^=e,-j+)Uj. Thus, 
fi. is random disturbance characterizing the i th commodity (or 
industry) and constant through time. The following conditions 
are assumed. E[S(J=E[At;]=0, E[G{^^]=cr^g, E[n.^]=a\, E[G;^ Mj]=0, 
for all i, t, and j. E[G^ Gjg]=0 if t?^s or and E[Mj Mj]=0 
if Also, E[e.J=cr^g+(7^^, and E[e,^ if t?£s. 
There are four steps to obtain the coefficients in 
^^Here observations i and j are assumed to be independent. 
This assumption may not be plausible for individual commodity 
data. 
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equation (32) . First, obtain the residual variance estimator 
in the within-units regression using the least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) model. 
n 
1-1 
where d.=l when i=j, otherwise dj=0. J is each commodity and t 
is time. From the above model, is obtained. Secondly, 
LNRJ^ - O>(J + (I)I LNPJ^ + «2 CR^JLNPJ^ + (ÙJLNCJ +E*/ (33) 
is regressed to obtain the variance of the residual e**j. The 
"dot" and "bar" notation means that they are the means. Since 
the variance of e**j, equals a^^/T+a^^, will be 
calculated where is the variance of the residual across 
commodities (or industries). Thirdly, 0 will be obtained from 
e=l-[a^g/ (T-d^..) Finally, 
LnR^^-QLnR~ - (1-6) Pg+Pi {LnP^f.-QLnP^ ) 
+ p2 (CR^iLnP^^-QCR^jniPj ' )  +p3 {LnC^f. -&LnC]~)  
is estimated. Then, the coefficients will be reported. 
"More careful explanation about the method is in Greene 
(1990) . 
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B. Data 
Data sources are shown in Appendix. Sixteen commodities 
are chosen for testing because of data availability and 
relative homogeneity between imports and domestic goods. 
Market shares are calculated as domestically consumed domestic 
production (quantities marketed minus export) divided by sum 
of domestically consumed domestic production and import. As a 
measure of domestic cost, nominal wages for each industry is 
used. For exchange rates, either effective exchange rates or 
units of yen per dollar are used depending on whether import 
markets are dominated by U.S. products. Statistics by the 
MITI shows that 78.5 percent of all imports from any countries 
to Japan are denominated in dollars. For products whose 
origins are not the U.S., both variables for exchange rates 
are tested and the results are very similar. 
Quarterly data are used. About forty observations 
(between 1978 and 1989, depending on data availability) are 
tested. For the testing of production concentration ratios, 
quarterly data between 1982 and 1987 are used. Data for 
concentration ratios are not quarterly. They are the numbers 
calculated at a certain time of the year by the source 
institutions. Commodity specific concentration ratios are 
ratios at a certain time in 1980. Concentration ratios for 
groups of commodities are published every other year by the 
Fair trade Commission and three series of data in 1982, 1984, 
68 
and 1986 are actually used. 
Data for sixteen commodities are used. The items are 
acrylonitrile, ethylene, ureo (these are chemicals), cotton 
fabrics, synthetic fabrics, wool fabrics (these are textile 
fabrics), round bars, heavy and medium steel plates, sections, 
hot rolled sheets, hot rolled wide steel strips, wire rods 
(these are ordinary steel products), kraft liner, newsprint 
paper, white paper board (these are paper products) and 
soybeans. 
A explanation for each commodity is added in the 
Appendix. 
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VI. RESULT 
The following tables summarize the results. Table 5 
presents the results of the regression for equation (29). The 
sum of the coefficients for lagged import prices in terms of 
foreign currency, a^, the sum of the coefficients for lagged 
exchange rates, the coefficients for tariff rate and the 
coefficients for domestic cost are reported. Since each model 
has relatively large number of regressors, the is high. 
The corrected R^ are reported and also are marked when the 
F-statistics are significant at the 0.05 level. The ultimate 
time length until pass-through effects seem to last, 1, are 
chosen at the point where the corrected R^ are maximized for 
each commodity or the F-statistics are statistically 
significant.^ since we lose the degree of freedom because of 
^For example, in the case of ureo, the corrected R^ is 
maximized when the model includes the eleven-lagged data. 
However, the F-statistics is significant when the model 
includes the three-lagged data. The difference of the 
corrected R^ is less than one percent. In some cases like 
this, 1 are chosen at the point before the decreasing margin 
of the corrected R^ starts to become large and the F-
statistics is significant. Furthermore, the lag length is 
chosen to consistently represent the results of the hypothesis 
testings (presented in Table 6). For example, the results of 
the hypothesis testings for the model of ureo which includes 
up to the three-lagged data, are the same as the ones for the 
model which includes up to the six-, five-, four-, two-, or 
one-lagged data. When the model has the eight-, or seventh-
lagged data, the F-statistics for the hypothesis that CK^=0!2 is 
not statistically significant. With all of this 
consideration, the three-lagged model is selected for ureo. 
The lag lengths of ethylene, ureo, kraft liner and soybeans 
are chosen by the different criteria from the largest 
corrected R^. 
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Table 5. Wholesale price as a dependant variable 
Û=1 *2 *3 *4 1 R2 
Acrylonitrile 0. ,04 0.13 -1.6 
(1.1) 1 
6.1*10^ 
[4.7*10^ 
9 
) 
0.98* 
Ethylene 0. ,53 0.12 -2.4 
(4.2) 
0.12 
(0.018) 
9 0.99* 
Ureo 0. 19 0.90 -0.058 
(0.044) 
3 0.96* 
Cotton fabrics -0. 64 1.0 15* 
(3.3) 
-0.058 
(0.15) 
10 0.99 
Synthetic fabrics -0. 075 0.54 0. 70 
(0.24) 
0.24 
(0.029) 
>8 0.99* 
Wool fabrics -0. 084 -0.23 -0.15 
(0.15) 
0.72 
(3.7) 
8 0.85* 
Round bars 0. 042 -0.49 39 
(21) 
0.41 
(0.23) 
>11 0.84 
Plates 0. 46 0.33 -3.0 
(4.2) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
>11 0.97* 
Sections -0. 48 1.1 35* 
(15) 
0.13 
(0.072) 
9 0.58 
Sheets 0. 53 0.35 14 
(11) 
-0.012 
(0.031) 
>5 0.63 
Strips 0. 61 -•0.069 -1.2 
(4.9) 
0.028 
(0.016) 
9 0.93* 
Wire rods 1. 3 0.11 9.0 
(7.5j 
0.014 
(0.032) 
10 0.85* 
Kraft liner 0. 60 0.54 3.2 
(0.89) 
—0.064 
(0.065) 
6 0.90* 
Newsprint paper 0. 79 0.81 0.027 
(0.022) 
4 0.95* 
White paper board -0. 28 0.0070 1.3 0.043* 10 0.97* 
(0.39) (0.016) 
Soybeans 0. 37 0.84 0.012 
(0.076) 
7 0.90* 
For 0!j and cc^, the sum of coefficients for lagged 
variables are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* shows that the statistics is significant at the 0.05 
level. 1 is length of lags. 
71 
lagged data and large number of regressors, the time length at 
which the corrected are maximized are not obtained for 
three commodities such as synthetic fabrics, plates and 
sheets. For them, the corrected is still increasing at the 
point with the maximum time length. 
Table 6 reports the results for some statistical 
testings. The t-statistics in the first column show the 
results for tariff and exchange rate symmetry testing (see 
page 63). Four of thirteen commodities subject to tariffs 
(ureo, newsprint and soybeans are tariff free) show asymmetry. 
The coefficient of tariff rate for sections is very large, and 
the magnitude seems implausible. The standard error is also 
very high. These factors are exactly symptoms of 
multicollinearity. The model in which tariff is an explained 
variable with the other explanatory variables is regressed 
(i.e., Ln(l+T) is regressed on LnP* Lne and LnC) . The R^ 
(0.96) of this regression which is not corrected is larger 
than the one (0.89) in the model with wholesale price as an 
explained variable. This shows that the multicollinearity is 
highly skeptical. For the commodities which showed asymmetry, 
cotton fabrics, kraft liner and white paperboard, the 
multicollinearity does not seem like a problem. The 
coefficients of the exchange rate are relatively very small, 
compared to the coefficients of tariff, and those coefficients 
of tariff are statistically significant. 
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The F-statistics in the second column are the results for 
exogeneity testing for import prices. The exogenous import 
prices are rejected for five commodities (i.e., ethylene, 
ureo, synthetic textile fabrics, white paperboard and 
soybeans) of sixteen commodities. The source countries of 
ethylene, ureo and synthetic textile are scattered. On the 
other hand, the large portion of imported white paperboard and 
soybeans comes from the U.S. In 1986, 98 percent of the 
imports was exported from the U.S. The U.S. data show that 46 
percent of the exported paper for base stock for milk cartons 
and similar containers was shipped to Japan in 1986. 75 
percent of the imported soybeans are from the U.S. This 
amount is about 20 percent of exported U.S. soybeans. 
The F-statistics in the third column shows whether import 
price significantly contributes the model. The hypothesis is 
tested by whether o:^=a2=a3=0. For round bars and sections, 
import price change does not influence wholesale price. The 
model for sections does not explain the data, since the 
corrected is not very large and the F-statistics is not 
significant. In round bars' case, it may be due to 
overwhelming market share of domestically produced bars. 
Small bars are ordered in small lots and the demand is 
complicated and changeable (see the Appendix B). These 
characteristics may make them inappropriate for large imports. 
The results of these testings are very sensitive to the 
length of the lags. For the exogeneity testing, the results 
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for ureo and soybeans are sensitive to the lags. For the 
symmetry testing between the exchange rate and tariff, the 
result for kraft liner is sensitive. 
Table 7 summarizes the short-run and long-run pass-
through effects of exchange rates (i.e., the coefficients of 
Ln e., %/;.) for each commodity. The short-run pass-through 
effects are equal to the effects up to the second quarter 
(/7o+/7,+/72) . The long-run effects are the sum of where i goes 
from zero to 1. The long-run pass-through coefficients show 
the diversity among the commodities. For some commodities 
such as ureo, cotton fabrics, sections, kraft liner, 
newsprint, and soybeans, the coefficients are very large. On 
the other hand, for acrylonitrile, ethylene, plates, sheets, 
and wire, the pass-through results are very low. When import 
price fell mainly because of exchange rate changes, wholesale 
price of strips was very stable. 
Table 8 and 9 summarize the regression results for 
equations (30) and (31). The coefficients and the corrected 
are reported. The hypothesis that the import prices do not 
influence market shares or import quantity is tested and the 
result is presented in the last columns. Import prices 
negatively related to market shares for kraft liner and they 
are statistically significant. The data show that when import 
price tends to decrease, the market share by domestic 
producers increases, while wholesale prices decrease. It 
seems that domestic producers significantly squeezed their 
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Table 6. Testings for wholesale prices 
Hq : Hg Î HQ : 
*2=03 Gi=*2 @1=02=02=0 
Acrylonitrile -1.5 0.70 7.9* 
Ethylene -0.58 22* 47* 
Ureo 26* 230* 
Cotton fabrics 4.0* 2.4 49* 
Synthetic fabrics 0 « 66 35* 546* 
Wool fabrics 0.12 0.55 8.7* 
Round bars 1.9 0.11 0.61 
Plates -0.80 0.19 36* 
Sections 2.2* 3.7 3.0 
Sheets 1.2 0.47 11* 
Strips -0.28 0.085 15* 
Wire rods 1.2 4.5 15* 
Kraft liner 2.7* 0.24 31* 
Newsprint paper 0.19 200* 
White paper board 3.3* 15* 26* 
Soybeans 70* 41* 
The t-statistics for the first column. The F-
statistics for the second and the third columns. 
Table 7. Pass-through effects 
Short-run Long-run 
Acrylonitrile 0.20 0.13 
Ethylene 0.31 0.12 
Ureo 0.17 0.90 
Cotton fabrics 0.50 1.0 
Synthetic fabrics 0.40 0.54 
Wool fabrics -0.02 -0.55 
Round bars -0.51 -0.49 
Plates 0.15 0.33 
Sections 0.23 1.1 
Sheets 0.12 0.35 
Strips 0.10 -0.069 
Wire rods 0.20 0.11 
Kraft liner 0.02 0.83 
Newsprint paper 0.31 0.81 
White paper board 0.053 0.0070 
Soybeans 0.58 0.84 
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profit margin to gain more market share when import prices 
were considerably falling. The coefficients of import prices 
for sheets also show negative sign, but the explanatory power 
of import prices is not statistically significant. For other 
commodities, signs for the coefficients of import prices are 
as expected. In Table 9, twelve of sixteen commodities 
support negatively slopped import demand function. The 
coefficients of import prices have the same sign as the 
coefficients of domestic costs for nine of sixteen 
commodities. This can not be explained in the model. As we 
can seen in Table 3, the signs should be reversed. However, 
the coefficients of domestic costs are not statistically 
significantly different from zero and the explanatory power of 
import prices is not statistically significant for the half of 
the commodities. 
Table 10 summarizes Tables 5, 8, and 9. The mark 
represents that import price or domestic cost statistically 
significantly influences wholesale price, market share or 
import quantity. The mark "?" means that the sign was 
contradictory to the expected one. 
More specifically, the "*" in the column for d R / d P  should 
coincide with on the third column in Table 6. The on 
the columns for 0R/3C, dS/dP, ds/dc, dIfdP, and 9l/9c, 
respectively, reconcile the for in Table 5, the last 
column in Table 8, Table 8, the last column in Table 9 
and Y2 in Table 9. The blank cells mean that an impact of 
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Table 8. Market shares as dependent variables 
Acrylonitrile 
Ethylene 
Ureo 
Cotton fabrics 
Synthetic fabrics 
Wool fabrics 
Round bars 
Plates 
Sections 
Sheets 
Strips 
Wire rods 
Kraft liner 
Newsprint paper 
White paper board 
Soybeans 
^1 Pz 
0.056 -0.21*10" 
(-0.00013) 
0.87 0.058 
(0.042) 
0.57 0.052 
(0.053) 
0.27 0.0062 
(0,041) 
0.073 -0.061 
(0.016) 
0.94 -0.012 
(0.005) 
0.0015 -0.0059 
(0.0038) 
0.097 0.0055 
(0.025) 
0.014 -0.0071 
(0.0033) 
-6.8 -0.41 
(0.37) 
0.62 -0.026 
(0.031) 
0.11 0.038 
(0.019) 
-0.14 0.033 
(0.022) 
0.078 -0.029 
(0.022) 
0.0061 0.010 
(0.0057) 
0.046 -0.040* 
(0.0086) 
1 r2 Ho:yff,=0 
3 0.40* 0.37 
4 0.71* 27* 
4 0.91* 230* 
4 0.96* 60* 
1 0.75* 16* 
5 0.78* 13* 
1 0.12 1.8 
6 0.69* 0.79 
5 0.62* 29* 
5 0.75* 4.1 
4 0.65* 12* 
3 0.41* 15* 
5 0.61* 22* 
6 0.68* 2.3 
5 0.21 0.87 
5 0.71* 10* 
Standard errors in parentheses. * shows that the 
statistics is significant at 0.05 level. The last 
column reports the F-statistics. 
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Table 9. Import quantities as dependent variables 
Ki Yz 1 R2 Ho:Ki=0 
Acrylonitrile 0.27 0.0016 
(0.0011) 
6 0.51* 0.29 
Ethylene -0.97 -0.036 
(0.14) 
5 0.60* 48* 
Ureo -2.9 -0.39 
(0.40) 
4 0.82* 110* 
Cotton fabrics -1.1 -0.12 
(0.21) 
3 0.70 24* 
Synthetic fabrics -0.43 0.13 
(0.28) 
1 0.74 10* 
Wool fabrics -3.0 -0.19 
(0.53) 
4 0.89 27* 
Round bars -1.8 -0.52 
(0.85) 
2 0.71* 46* 
Plates 0.21 0.20 6 0.96* 2.1 
Sections 
(0.23) 
-2.8 0.87 
(0.42) 
5 0.81* 73* 
Sheets 1.3 -0.0027 
(0.25) 
5 0.48 0.36 
Strips -1.3 0.34 
(0.25) 
8 0.28* 3.1 
Wire rods -2.7 -2.0 
(1.1) 
6 0.46* 1.4 
Kraft liner 0.15 -0.16 
(0.13) 
4 0.35* 0.15 
Newsprint paper -0.49 0.42 
(0.24) 
5 0.81* 0.90 
White paper board -0.33 -0.51 
(0.33) 
5 0.31 0.68 
Soybeans -0.19 0.33 
(0.043) 
4 0.60* 15* 
Standard errors in parentheses. * shows that the 
statistics is significant at the 0.05 level. The last 
column reports the F-statistics. 
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Table 10. The summary 
9R/ap aR/3c as/ap as/ac ai/a? ai/ac 
Acrylonitrile * 
Ethylene * * * 
Ureo * * * 
Cotton fabrics * * * 
Synthetic fabrics ****
Wool fabrics * * * * 
Round bars * 
Plates * 
Sections * * 
Sheets * 
Strips * * 
Wire rods * * 
Kraft liner * ? 
Newsprint paper * 
White paper board * * 
Soybeans * * * * 
* shows statistically significant relationship. ? means 
that the sign is wrong. 
independent variable (P or C) on dependent variable (R, S, or 
I) is not statistically significant. 
Equations, (29), (30), and (31) are estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS). Only when the hypothesis that the first 
order autoregressive disturbance is zero is rejected using the 
Durbin-Watson statistics for several commodities, feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) (or estimated generalized 
least squares) are used. For the hypothetical testing when 
the first-order autoregressive disturbance is serious, OLS are 
used after the data are transformed by the autoregressive 
model. Specifically, "Proc Autoreg" in SAS/ETS software is 
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used with output statement which identifies input data to be 
transformed. 
The commodities can be classified into several groups. 
Some commodities such as soybeans and synthetic textile belong 
to the first group. Their market environments appear to be 
competitive. For example, in the case of soybeans, their 
wholesale price, market share and import quantity are 
sensitive to changes in import price and domestic cost. 
Furthermore, the pass-through coefficient was as high as 80 
percent. A change in domestic cost does not affect wholesale 
price. This may be explained by very small market share by 
domestic producers (Table A2). Secondly, for some commodities 
such as ethylene, ureo, and cotton fabrics, the import prices 
influence the domestic economy while a change in domestic 
costs does not at all. For some other commodities, import 
price does not necessarily affect all of these three 
variables. A change in import price of strips and wire rods 
affects whole sale price and market share. A change in import 
price of acrylonitrile, sheets, plates and newsprinting paper 
affects wholesale price, but that does not affect market share 
or import quantity. A change in import price of bars affects 
import quantity while that does not affect wholesale price or 
market share. For these ten commodities, a change in domestic 
cost does not influence any variables. This can not be well-
explained by the model. Table 4 shows that there should be 
still positive relation between wholesale price and domestic 
80 
cost, while there will be no effect of domestic cost on market 
share or import quantity under ratio quota. One of the 
possible explanations is that only labor cost for the 
estimation of production cost may not be appropriate.' 
Japanese producers may not perceive short-run fluctuations in 
labor cost as their prominent determinant to influence their 
decisions. Particularly, if we recognize the Japanese 
employment system as the "guaranteed employment" in which life 
time employment is still common, labor may be treated as a 
fixed cost. 
Equation (32) is regressed both with production 
concentration ratios (only 1980) and industry concentration 
ratios (for 1982, 1984, and 1986). The results are 
respectively presented in Table 11. For the former case, the 
coefficient for the interactive term of ratio and import 
price, yOg, has a wrong sign and is statistically significant. 
It indicates that the more concentrated a market is, the 
larger the wholesale price response is, which does not make 
sense. The problem in this estimation is that the group mean 
regression in (33) may be heteroscedastic. For equation (32) 
with industry concentration ratios which are obtained every 
two years, the coefficient for domestic cost, p^, has a wrong 
'ohno (1989) showed that production cost in machinery and 
equipment industries is dominated by labor cost in Japan. 
Hooper and Mann (1989) used a weighted average of unit labor 
cost (0.65) and price index for raw material and energy inputs 
(0.35) for production cost in manufacturing industries. 
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sign but it is not statistically significant. The data do not 
necessarily support the role of the number of producers which 
is tested using production concentration ratios. 
Table 11. The models for testing concentration ratios 
Equation (32) with 
production concentration 
ratios for each good 
Equation (32) with 
industry concentration 
ratios for each 
industry 
Py 
Pi 
Pi 
F 
-0.11 0.053 
(0.053)* (0.035) 
0.11 0.79 
(0.019)* (0.087)* 
0.00022 -0.0010 
(0.000059)* (0.00014) 
0.013 -0.041 
(0.0085) (0.025) 
0.28 0.33 
50 61 
Standard errors in parentheses. * shows that the 
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 
0.05 level. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In order to investigate the Japanese trade policies, the 
model which differentiates several possible "invisible" 
restrictions is presented. Using sixteen commodities, whether 
the markets are competitive or quantitatively restricted is 
tested. Two commodities are reported to be probably 
competitive. Import prices of some commodities such as white 
paperboard and soybeans seem endogenously determined. The 
question, why domestic costs do not seem to affect the 
variables, remained to be well-explained. Since Japanese 
producers do not increase wholesale price when domestic cost 
increases, we can not simply conclude from the model that they 
try to maintain market share. It seems that domestic factors 
are not determinants to alter the system. A risk which is 
caused by a change in domestic cost may be diversified in the 
distributional system. 
Furthermore, the following results are found. The 
magnitudes of the pass-through coefficients vary among the 
commodities. While some commodities which seem to be in 
competitive environments have very high coefficients, the 
coefficients for the other commodities are very small. The 
lag length for the pass-through odes not show special 
difference form U.S. data. The symmetry of exchange rates and 
tariffs is also tested. Four of thirteen data rejected the 
hypothesis. The test of the impact of number of domestic 
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producers using concentration ratios did not show clear 
evidence for that role. 
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IX. APPENDIX 
A. Data Source 
Quantities marketed/exported/imported, import/export prices 
and wholesale prices 
Yearbook of Paper and Pulp Statistics 
Yearbook of Iron and Steel Statistics 
Yearbook of Textiles Statistics 
Yearbook of Chemistry Statistics 
(Compiled by Research and Statistics Department: 
Minister's Secretariat. MITI) 
Wholesale price index 
Price Index Annual (The Bank of Japan) 
Import/export value/quantities 
Japan Export and Imports (Japan Tariff Association) 
Wage 
Japan Statistical Yearbook 
(Stat.Bureau Price Minister's Office) 
Tariff 
Customs Tariff Schedules of Japan 
(Japan Tariff Association) 
Changes in Tariff Schedule (Japan Tariff Association) 
Production/industry concentration ratio 
Yearly Report (the Fair Trade Commission) 
Exchange Rate 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) 
B. Description for Commodities 
Among chemical products, acrylonitrile is used to 
manufacture acrylic rubber and fibers, and ethylene is a 
source of many organic compounds, in welding and cutting 
metals. Ureo is used as a fertilizer. The 96.3 percent of 
import of acrylonitrile is dominated by the largest six 
general trading companies. For domestically produced 
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acrylonitrile, transactions among the same "Keiretsu" are 
overwhelming. Ureo industry has been designated as a 
depressed industry and applied to the depressed industry 
cartel. The largest four firms completely dominate the 
industry. 
There are two types of wholesalers in steel industry: 
first wholesalers and second wholesalers. The former includes 
the large nine general trading companies and the other smaller 
specialized wholesalers (about 70-80 firms). The percentage 
of the quantities handled by the general trading companies was 
56.7 in 1980. Each of the large steel producers has one 
particular general trading company as its main trading partner 
and it maintains business relationship on a smaller scale with 
the other wholesalers. Domestic products are handled by the 
first wholesalers, and go through the second wholesalers. In 
general, the first wholesalers do not handle imports, while 
the second wholesalers do because of less expensive prices. 
Heavy and medium steel plates and hot rolled sheets (both are 
represented as plates and sheets in tables) are used to 
manufacture automobiles and electric appliances. Demand for 
sheets and plates has expanded over the years along with the 
development of those industries. In Japan, the percentage of 
direct sales by steel-makers is small. The wholesalers have 
played a major role in the Japanese steel distribution. 
However, there have been a increasing trend for some users to 
access major domestic producers. Toyota and Nissan have been 
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requesting the type of direct sales and have restricted the 
activities by the general trading companies. 
Small bars, which represent large portion of round bars 
are used for construction. The demand for small bars is 
complicated and very changeable. The orders come in small 
lots with unspecified number from small construction firms. 
That can be symbolically shown in Table Al. A very large 
portion of small bars is distributed by the general trading 
companies and they overwhelmingly control the market (Kondo) 
Plates, sheets, hot rolled wide steel strips (strips in 
the tables) and wire rods are produced by large integrated 
iron and steel manufactures. On the other hand, productions 
of sections and especially bars are much more scattered. 
Table Al. Production concentration Ratios (1980) by the 
largest three producers 
Acrylonitrile 65.4 
Ethylene 34.5 
Ureo 63.9 
Cotton fabrics 9.6 
Synthetic fabrics 47.4 
Wool fabrics 18.2 
Round bars 14.6 
Plates 70.7 
Sections 45.0 
Sheets 79.8 
Strips 78.6 
Wire rods 71.6 
Kraft liner 29.3 
Newsprint paper 63.9 
White paper board 36.2 
Soybeans (edible soybean oil) 54.2 
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In order to reduce trade friction with the U.S., Japan 
has been significantly decreasing tariffs on several paper 
products. A tariff rate for Kraft liner has fallen from 15 
percent to 3.5 percent between 1978 and 1988, while one for 
White paper board from 10 percent to 2.5 percent during the 
same period. Kraft liner is used for a surface of paper 
board. White paper board is used mainly for containers of 
edible liquid such as milk, thick printing paper such as 
colored post cards, and printed boxes for cosmetics, 
pharmacies etc. and so on. Production of newsprint paper is 
more concentrated compared to production of kraft liner of 
white paperboard. 
Data of some textile fabrics and soybeans are also used 
for empirical testing. 
The following tables show ranges of the level of market 
shares of domestic products, and of relative changes in 
wholesale prices, R, import prices, P, and domestic costs, C, 
during the tested period. 
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Table A2. Market shares by domestic products 
Acrylonitrile 54.945-99.762 
Ethylene 54.137-93.062 
Ureo 56.254-99.312 
Cotton fabrics 53.800-99.312 
Synthetic fabrics 82.701-92.686 
Wool fabrics 89.438-98.654 
Round bars 96.420-100.00 
Plates 76.662-99.662 
Sections 96.652-99.984 
Sheets -11.751-75.320 
Strips 68.855-99.549 
Wire rods 86.424-99.996 
Kraft liner 82.020-94.244 
Newsprint paper 85.078-98.465 
White paper board 96.977-99.434 
Soybeans (edible soybean oil) 3.45-11.561 
Table A3. A range of relative change of R and P 
for each good, and C for each industry 
Acrylonitrile 0. 82-1.20 0. 46-1.17 
Ethylene 0. 72-1.02 0. 32-1.06 
Ureo 0. 55-1.02 0. 24-1.0 1-•1. 46 
Cotton fabrics 0. 73-1.12 0. 50-1.13 
Synthetic fabrics 0. 76-1.05 0. 40-1.03 
Wool fabrics 1. 0-1.23 0. 58-1.01 1-•1. 35 
Round bars 0. 68-1.43 0. 91-52.3 
Plates 1. 0-1.23 0. 83-1.41 
Sections 0. 92-1.24 0. 45-1.44 
Sheets 0. 97-1.04 0. 88-1.15 
Strips 1. 0-1.19 0. 77-1.33 
Wire rods 0. 99-1.22 0. 65-1.32 1-1. 48 
Kraft liner 0. 69-1.08 0. 61-1.13 
Newsprint paper 1. 0-1.32 0. 82-1.44 
White paper board 0. 98-1.25 0. 85-1.63 1-1. 44 
Soybeans 0. 87-2.32 0. 69-2.08 1-1. 29 
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PART II. MEASURING MARKET POWER FOR MARKETING FIRMS: 
THE CASE OF JAPANESE SOYBEAN MARKETS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bresnahan (1982) introduced a measure of market power 
which can be econometrically estimated. This part extends his 
idea for marketing firms which have potential for price 
discrimination. Also, Japanese soybean markets are 
investigated with the model, suggesting an unusual price 
setting for several years after the U.S. soybean embargo. An 
analysis for welfare loss and exchange rate transmission is 
also presented. 
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II. MEASURING MARKET POWER COEFFICIENTS FOR MARKETING FIRMS 
The firm's profit maximizing rule is to set perceived 
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. In a competitive 
market, any attempt by one firm to raise prices by restricting 
supply would result in increased supply by other firms so that 
no individual firm has any power to influence market prices. 
Hence, their perceived marginal revenue equals price and in 
equilibrium they equate their marginal revenue to marginal 
cost. When market power exists, both perceived marginal 
revenue and marginal cost are less than price. 
Bresnahan (1982) argues that market power in an industry 
can be measured as a coefficient, A, in the following relation 
between price (P) and quantity (Q): 
p. MC-XO^ 
This function postulates equality between perceived marginal 
revenue and marginal cost. When A=0, the market is perfectly 
competitive. When ^ =1, the market is monopolistic. In an 
oligopolistic market structure, À lies between zero and unity. 
Let inverse demand and marginal cost be P=G(Q,Y,a) and 
MC=C(Q,W,/ff), where a and P are parameters, while Y and W are 
exogenous consumer income and wages, respectively. Then the 
pricing relation becomes 
P  -  C { Q , N , ^ )  -  k Q - ^ ( Q , Y , a )  
95 
Treating P and Q as endogenous variables, the demand function 
and pricing relation are simultaneously estimated to reveal 
the market power coefficient, A. 
However, Bresnahan explains that the degree of market 
power. A, cannot be identified unless an additional 
interaction between price and income is included in a system 
of linear demand and marginal costs. If a change in the 
exogenous variable on the demand side only, Y, causes a 
parallel shift of the demand function, the hypotheses of 
competition and monopoly can not be differentiated. 
However, when characteristics of marketing firms and 
their sales environment are recognized, Bresnahan's additional 
variable can become unnecessary. For illustration, let us 
consider a general formulation of the marketing problem. Let 
us assume that firms buy from producers and sell the product 
to human consumers and large scale processors. Further, 
marginal revenues differ in the product markets due to 
differences in demand elasticities and market power. 
Marketing firm's costs arise due to material and processing 
costs. Costs are also higher for the human consumption 
market, owing to local distribution costs. 
The following equation (1) shows that the demand for 
direct human consumption depends on real price and real 
income. Equation (2) tells us that the demand for processing 
is determined by real margins to produce oil and meals from 
soybeans or rapeseed, and the capacity of factories. 
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CPJi 
Y  (1) 
•^2 -  Po + Pi ( 
where D., P,. are quantity demanded and price in market iJ In 
turn, perceived marginal revenues depend on market power and 
the parameters of the demand functions; 
where MRj are perceived marginal revenues in market i. 
A general formulation of the cost function specifies 
material and processing components and adjusts processing 
costs with wages (W): 
where Q, are marketing firms' outputs for market i. Notice 
that costs are higher in the local market of the human 
consumption when Also, marginal costs are different and 
increasing when and are positive. 
Pricing relationships for both product markets can be 
developed from solutions to the profit maximization problem 
for marketing firms. The profit function is: 
^Additional variable definitions are given in Appendix. 
MRi - Pi - andMR^ -
-P'(Oi+%) [as(£)i+i?2)+-|^ (0i+02)^] + [ag:0i+-^Cf]} 
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TC - Pi + ^2-^2 ~ C ( Q^, O2 ) • 
This function can be expressed in terms of D,'s by noting that 
and Qj = Dj + S, where S is the change in ending stocks. 
Then the first order conditions for profit maximization are: 
- M?! - {f*+P/[ag+Pg(Di+D2+g)] + - 0 
- MR2 - {f*+f/[ag+pg(Di+D2+g) ]} - 0. 
The implied pricing functions are: 
(CF%) + (ag+ocg^) W^(Pg+Pai) {WD^) +P 5(^02)+P (3) 
P2 - (CFJ2D2)+AGP/+PG(PIT>I) +PG(M)2) +PA(R/S) +F'. (4) 
H I  
Let us check the necessary conditions of identification 
for the simultaneous equations. Rewriting (3) and (4), 
PI - (L)I(CPJIZ7I)+(J)2FI^+(|)3WDI+PS(F«?2+P/5)+P* (3)' 
P2 - (l^iiCPJ^Dz)+cCgW+^ ^ {WD^+WDz+WS)+P* . (4) '  
where <p^=A/a^, 
Now equations, (1), (2), (3)', and (4)' can be treated as 
usual linear simultaneous equations, ignoring some parameter 
restrictions. If these equations satisfy the necessary 
condition without considering the parameter restrictions, it 
means that they can be surely identified with the parameter 
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restrictions. Hence, we apply the ordinary order condition 
for each equation for identification and show that the each 
equation satisfies the condition. There are ten endogenous 
variables and five exogenous variables: 
endogenous\P^. > CPlzD^, PTOi, 
m^+VfS 
exogenous-. c, P-
The criteria for identifying an equation is that the number of 
included endogenous variables less one must be less than or 
equal to the number of excluded exogenous variables. For 
instance, two endogenous variables are included in equation 
(1) (D, and P,/CPI^) . Four exogenous variables are excluded. 
Thus, equation (1) is identified. Following the same rule, 
equations (2), (3)' and (4)' are also identified. 
Furthermore, and /Ig can both be determined from the first 
coefficient of the respective price equations and demand price 
response parameters and yff,) . Thus, the oligopoly solution 
is identified for marketing sectors with two product markets. 
For subsequent empirical investigations, the capacity 
adjustments by marketing firms should also be included. Now 
the profit function is 
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[P* (O1+O2) + W (as (Qt-QT) + (OT-QT^^ 
+ ccgj ( Qi - Qi ) + ( Ci - l2i ) ^> ] 
where and are capacities, and Q^=Q^+Q2.^^ Now the pricing 
functions are 
Pi-AcPJ,Z?i+ (a s+a si) P/+(Ps+P si) ^ i+P + ^  gP/g-PgP/Ôr-P 
«1 
f2 - 4^ CffgDg + agW + PsP®i + Psra?2 + PaP/a- - ^ s^QT + (6) 
Pi 
where (6) is identical to (4) except one term, -yffgWQ^ and 
there are more additional terms in (5) compared to (3). The 
four equations (1), (2), (5), and (6) are still identified as 
are and 
The cost structure of marketing firms is an empirical 
issue. Short-run marginal cost functions could be constant 
(jffg=0) in both markets when capital stock (handling and 
storage equipment) is fixed and variable costs are 
proportional to labor and energy used for handling. Further, 
Thompson and Dahl hypothesize economies of scale in 
transportation, information network, risk bearing and storage 
^Capacities such as c in equation (2), and Q, are 
obtained by connecting peaks of variables such as D^, and 
Q^, respectively. 
^Instead of taking the difference of output and capacity, 
the ratio may be an alternative way. 
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space for U.S. grain exporters. As scale of operations 
increase and firms accumulate capital, marginal cost of 
marketing firms could decrease over longer run periods. The 
inverse relation between marginal cost and capacity in the 
above cost function potentially accounts for these long run 
cost adjustments. 
Japanese Soybean Markets 
Soybean markets in Japan seem well-suited for testing 
this model. There are two primary soybean usages in Japan. 
One is for direct human consumption as food (Tofu, Natto, 
etc.) except oil, and the other is for livestock feeds and 
oil. The former market accounts for 3 0 percent of all soybean 
consumption in the nation. More than 88 percent of soybeans 
are imported with the primary sources being the U.S., China, 
and Brazil. Crushing mills are located at the seacoast to 
take advantage of low transportation costs. Other imported 
soybeans are unloaded there and sent to urban areas where 
human consumption points are concentrated. 
Figure 1 shows that import point prices and export prices 
from the U.S. adjusted by the exchange rate and transportation 
costs have behaved similarly. Similarly, Tokyo wholesale 
prices from the early 1970s and post 1979 period closely 
reflect import prices. However, there appears to be an 
episode of extremely high wholesale prices during 1973-1978 
after the U.S. embargo in 1973. World-wide supplies were 
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short in 1973, and all import and wholesale prices increased. 
However, domestic wholesale prices increased more than 
proportionately and remained high even after world prices 
declined. This period of high domestic prices may have been 
triggered by the U.S. embargo. The soybean embargo was in 
effect for five days beginning June 21, 1973. Afterwards, 
export licenses were set at 50% of unfilled export contracts 
until September 1, 1973 (Kost, et al.).* 
Figure 2 represents soybeans processed for oil and meals, 
(sold in market 2) and soybean consumed directly (sold in 
market 1). Figure 3 shows changes in soybean ending stocks 
for processors. These graphs suggest that there was an 
inventory buildup in anticipation of the embargo. However, 
consumption behavior does not seem unusual, i.e., there was a 
consumption decrease in the presence of high domestic prices 
during the high prices of the early seventies. 
^After the Tanaka government was established, the public 
finance policy they implemented (pumping money) induced "crazy 
prices" in 1973. The general trading companies speculated in 
daily necessities and held them off the market in anticipation 
of further price rises. The oil crisis followed and the 
inflation which already existed was accelerated. During 1973, 
the country experienced a 29 percent inflation rate. 
Industrial cartels were making huge profits under these 
circumstances. This specific economic environment in 1973 may 
be another possible explanation. 
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Figure 2. Soybeans processed for oils and meals/soybeans 
consumed directly 
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Figure 3. Ending stock 
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III. DATA AND ESTIMATION FOR THE SOYBEAN MARKET 
Specification of demand relationships in Japanese soybean 
markets and preliminary hypothesis testing produced a more 
precise system of demand and pricing functions. These 
functions are shown below as equations (7) through (10). 
The demand function for the human consumption market (1) 
is a per capita function. Then population becomes a scaling 
factor for independent variables in the market demand 
function, as shown in equation (7) below. Also, separability 
for food consumption is assumed, so Y/CPI^ and P^/CPI^ in 
equation (1) are the ratios of nominal household expenditure 
on food and nominal soybean wholesale price to a consumer 
price index on food (Phlips, p. 73). Finally, seasonal trends 
in soybean consumption are taken into account with dummy 
variables: one for both the second and third quarters, and the 
other for the fourth quarter. 
In market 2, rapeseed margins are included as an 
exogenous variable in equation (8) since it is expected that 
soybeans would be replaced by this important substitute if 
rapeseed profitability increased. A capacity measure is also 
included as an explanation for the secular increase in demand. 
The equations are estimated with three-stage least 
squares approach. The reason to use the simultaneous system 
is that the parameters are nonlinear and we need to test the 
statistical significance for the market power coefficient. 
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The SAS/ETS provides the methods to estimate parameters in a 
simultaneous system of nonlinear equations, i.e., SYSNLIN 
procedure. In the procedure, we specify both endogenous and 
exogenous variables, initial values of parameters to be 
estimated, and the model. In order to test several 
hypotheses, we first run the unrestricted model, and then run 
the restricted model, we specify the matrices (such as 
estimates of the true covariance of the equation errors) which 
are obtained from the unrestricted model (SAS/ETS manual 1984, 
526). Finding the difference of the statistics labeled 
OBJECTIVE*N for both models, and using a Chi-square table to 
compare this difference with the Chi-square statistics, we 
conclude the results for the hypotheses. 
Several preliminary specifications of pricing equations 
were also examined. In particular, the data supported the 
notion of constant marginal costs for both markets. That is, 
the coefficients and were not statistically significant. 
With regard to market power, the coefficient /Ig was not 
statistically significant. Similarly, the market power 
coefficient was not statistically significant in some 
preliminary specifications. However, was found to be 
statically significant when we specified "an episode" of 
monopoly pricing between 1973 and the first half of 1978. 
Hence, equation (5) is slightly changed as follows: 
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CPI D 
Pi [A,iiCf+Xi2 (1-d) ] + (a g+a^j,) P/+ (P s+Psi) 
+ P^WDa + p^P/5 - P^P/Oj. - ^ si^Qi + P* (5)' 
where d=l between 1973 and 1978; d=0 otherwise. 
Then the equations are simultaneously estimated and the 
hypothesis = 0, /ij = 0, yffg ~ ® and = 0 is tested. The 
is 7.72, which is less than X^(4,.05). The hypothesis can't 
be rejected at the 0.05 level. 
A typical system of estimation equations for Japan's 
soybean market is shown below: 
M + «2-C^ + «3^23^ + «4^4^ (7) 
Dz - P.+Pi ^  + P, ^  + P,C (8) 
Pi - ^ + («s+asi) + -P* (9) 
Pg - a gf/ + f * (10) 
The list of variables, their definitions and data source are 
given in Table 1. Quarterly data for 1971 through 1988 are 
used for each variable. Most data come from domestic Japanese 
sources. 
There are three factors which enabled us to identify the 
market power coefficients. They are the two market 
assumption, the demand specification (involving exogenous CPI 
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and N), and the marginal cost to be linearly homogeneous in 
prices which is derived after the hypothesis testing. 
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IV. RESULT 
Table 1 summarizes the empirical results. Two sets of 
estimates are shown. One is a full system while the other 
includes only direct human consumption market. The latter 
system is reestimated because of concerns about the 
plausibility of the import unit value as an accurate measure 
of transactions prices in the processing market (Pj) . 
Quantities of soybeans consumed in market 1 demonstrate a 
statistically significant negative relationship with relative 
prices of soybeans and a positive relationship with household 
expenditure on food. Statistically significant seasonal 
trends show that direct human consumption of soybeans is 
affected by seasonal factors, high in the fourth quarter and 
low in the second and third quarters. Food made from 
soybeans, such as tofu and aburaage, are largely consumed 
during the new year's celebration, the most important Japanese 
holiday, and high expenditure on food during the fourth 
quarter may be supported by the large additional income 
provided by December bonuses. 
The estimation of equation (8) shows that quantities of 
soybeans processed in market 2 are positively related to 
soybean margins and capacity. There is a negative 
relationship between quantities and rapeseed margins but it is 
not significant. 
In equation (10), the hypothesis that an intercept term 
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equals zero is not rejected. In equation (9), with t = 
7.2. These results specify the cost functions for the 
Japanese soybean marketing firms as 
TC - +a 
The statistically significant (t=2.53 or 2.35) 
suggests that the wholesale market was not competitive between 
1973 and the first half of 1978. The marketing firms might 
have exercised market power during this period.® 
®The increase in price in 1973 might be due to unusual 
circumstances. The model was tested excluding the four 
observations in the year, but was still statistically 
significant. The results are reported in the last column of 
table 1. 
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Table 1. Estimation results for equations (7), (8), (9), 
and(lO) 
Combined System Human Consumption Market Without 1973 
«0 0.024 (1.5) 0.022 (1.4) 0.026 (1.6) 
0.0047 (2.6) 0.0043 (2.4) 0.0054 (3.0) 
«2 0.41 (0.17) 0.69 (0.29) 0.13 (0.05) 
-0.0049 (-2.0) —0.0050 (-2.0) -0.0047 (-1.9) 
0.011 (2.3) 0.011 (2.2) 0.012 (2.4) 
-150 (-1.6) -150 (-1.6) 
360 (1.8) 400 (2.0) 
81 (0.36) 60 (0.26) 
A 0.98 (13) 0.98 (13) 
0.00019 (0.18) 0.00019 (0.18) 
"si 0.021 (7.2) 0.023 (6.8) 
0.021 (7.6) 
^>11 0.081 (2.5) 0.076 (2.4) 0.075 (2.7) 
R2 D.W. 
0. 62 1.4 
Pg 0. 87 1.0 
Ql 0. 58 2.4 
Qz 0. 77 2.4 
The insides of the parentheses are the t-statistics. 
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V. WELFARE ANALYSIS 
In order to reveal the degree of the market power 
coefficient effect, profit margins and consumer welfare losses 
which are based on estimates of demand functions and market 
power coefficients, are presented in this section. The 
pricing behavior and loss of consumer surplus is shown in 
Figure 4. The MR schedule depicts the firms' perception of 
how revenue changes when price changes, which depends on 
The condition that MR=MC defines the equilibrium price and 
quantity, P° and D°. The competitive solution is given at B. 
As approaches zero, MR rotates to D. Then the price 
reduces to marginal cost (5) and consumption expands to D®. 
The area of P°gBA is the consumer welfare loss. This area is 
P, 
pO 
S 
0 
MC 
Q 
Figure 4. 
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calculated from the values of P°j, MC^, D°^ and for each 
period from 1973 through the first half of 1978. The 
estimated demand, marginal revenue and marginal cost functions 
enable us to specify profit margins and to algebraically 
calculate the loss of consumer surplus. The inverse demand, 
marginal revenue, marginal cost functions as given by 
equations (7) and (9) are: 
CPI CPl 
CPJic , ajF. 
where oCjc"—^ [«o+-2^^+«3^23+W] 
and t shows that each variable depends on time. Each 
parameter follows the result in Table 2. 
The values that define the welfare area can be calculated 
from the above marginal revenue, marginal cost and price 
functions. The appropriate prices and quantities are given 
below. 
Profit margins are measured as /P°^ for each period. 
The average was 22 percent. The loss of consumer surplus 
during the period was 376 million dollars, of which 361 
million dollars were transferred to marketing firms and the 
rest was wasted as dead-weight loss. 
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VI. EXCHANGE RATE TRANSMISSION 
Another aspect of competitiveness in the markets is the 
degree of exchange rate transmission to the wholesale price. 
A perfectly competitive market has an elasticity of wholesale 
price with respect to exchange rate of unity, assuming that 
the pricing of soybean exporters is not affected by the 
exchange rate change, there are no transaction costs from 
import points to wholesale markets, and the country is not 
large enough to influence world market. Under these 
assumption, an incomplete exchange rate transmission is 
explained by profit margin adjustment in oligopolistic market 
structures. When there exist transaction or transportation 
costs from import points to wholesale markets, incomplete 
exchange rate transmission occurs even under competitive 
markets as can be seen below. 
Let us suppose that marketing cost (5) includes the 
product of the export country price and the exchange rate, P* 
= P • e where P* and P are import prices in yen and in dollars, 
and e is the exchange rate (yen per dollar). Then, any 
changes in the exchange rate are perceived through changes in 
import prices in terms of yen. When the exchange rate 
changes, import price in terms of yen will be affected as 
well, which will influence importers' marginal costs. Figure 
4 suggests that the level of P° is determined by a combination 
of demand, marginal revenue and marginal cost functions. The 
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argument through equation (11) clarifies that depends on 
demand conditions, marginal cost and market power. An 
exchange rate transmission elasticity is obtained, 
— -p- :— r-TT- where 0<A<1 
p de P dà de ^ ^  g"*"" 
where p® is export price of American soybeans, assuming that 
American exporters do not change their prices as a result of 
the change in exchange rate (i.e., 0p®/0e is zero). 
The elasticities from 1973 through the first half of 1978 
were calculated for each period. The average is 60.4 percent. 
Elasticities for the same period with an assumed competitive 
structure (/1=0) are 86.7 percent. The exchange rate 
transmission was incomplete in 1973-1978 while the yen was in 
a long appreciating trend against the dollar and was 
relatively stable. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Bresnahan's method to measure a market power coefficient 
was applied for marketing firms in which case an interactive 
exogenous variable with prices was not necessary. This two-
market model was tested for the Japanese soybean markets. The 
data are consistent with an episode in which prices were not 
set at a competitive level in the Japanese soybean wholesale 
market from 1973 through the first half of 1978. The 
statistically significant level of the market power 
coefficient in the model does not directly lead to the 
conclusion that there existed market power in the Japanese 
soybean wholesale market during the period. The high price 
setting may have been caused by other reasons such as 
speculative pricing by middlemen during the notorious "crazy" 
prices or marketing risks enlarged by the U.S. embargo in 
1973. The estimates suggest that consumers lost 376 million 
dollars during this episode, most of which were transferred to 
the importers. Also, the average of exchange rate 
transmission was 68.9 percent. 
The episode ceased in late 1978 and the market has been 
competitive since then. This could be explained by increased 
domestic supplies and imports of soybeans from China in the 
late 1970s. 
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IX. APPENDIX 
Variable Definition/source/unit 
D, Soybean utilization for direct consumption. 
Developed from production + import + change in 
stocks from the previous period/ 
Oil and Fats Monthly Reports (Yushi Geppo)/ 
lOOOt 
Dg Quantity processed soybean use meal and oil/ 
same/lOOOt 
S Quantity processed soybean use meal and oil/ 
same/lOOOt 
P^^ Price in market 1. Average of wholesale prices of 
Japanese, American and Chinese soybeans/ 
(1)Wholesale price from Tokyo Commodity Exchange 
(2)Market share from Daily Reports of Soybeans 
(Daizu Nippo); Journal of Food Industries/¥/kg 
P^ Price in market 2. Unit value of imported 
soybeans/ 
(1)Japan Exports & Imports: Japan Tariff Assoc. 
(2)Monthly Statistics of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries/¥/kg 
Pp Rapeseed price to large processors/same/¥/kg 
Mg Soybean margin (=Y°g*P°g+Y"g*P"g-P2)/Derived/¥/kg 
Mp Rapeseed margin (=Y°^*P°,j+Y"p*P"p-P„)/Derived/¥/kg 
Y"*,^ J yield from one ton of 1/ 
Oil and Fats Monthly reports (Yushi Geppo): Japan 
Oil and Fats Association/0-1 
6p^ _ pUs * fjgus + pJ A MS-" fP"^ * MS"^ where MS represents 
market share and superscripts US, J, and C respectively 
represent US, Japan, and China. 
^Meal and oil yields for soybeans and rapeseed are 
calculated by dividing soybean oil or meal production by 
soybean use by processors for every quarter between the first 
quarter of 1971 and the fourth quarter of 1988 and regressed 
on the time from 1 through 72. 
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Wholesale price of IJ (I: soybeans or rapeseed; J: 
oil or meal)/ 
National Conditions of Oil and fats (Wagakuni no 
Yushi Jijo): Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries/¥/kg 
Export price of American soybeans adjusted freight 
& exchange rate/ 
USDA for export price, freight adjustment from the 
International Wheat Council, exchange rate from 
IMF/y/kg 
Consumer price index for food/ 
Annual report on National Accounts: Economic 
Planning Agency/ 
1980=100 
Consumer price index/IMF/1970=100 
Population/IMF/million 
Nominal per person consumption of food, beverages 
& cigarettes/ 
(1)Annual Report on National Accounts 
(2)Reports on National Accounts based on 1980 
(Kokumin Keizai Hokoku): Economic Planning Agency/ 
¥1000 
capacity to process soybeans for oil or meal 
calculated from Q/ 
Derived/lOOOt 
Nominal wages in food industry/ 
Japan Statistical Yearbook: Stat. Bureau Prime 
Minister's 0ffice/¥1000 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
We have intended to clarify the characteristics of the 
Japanese "invisible" import restrictions in the paper. For 
several commodities, the markets appear to be fairly 
competitive. For the other commodities, the domestic economic 
variables do not move in any way to coincide with what the 
theoretical model predicts under the specific hypothetical 
import. This is because domestic cost changes do not seem to 
affect those variables, while changes in import prices affect 
them. Furthermore, we can not find the clear evidence for the 
role of the number of producers. 
It may be left for the future research to investigate how 
Japanese firms diversify the risk due to an increase in 
domestic cost. 
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